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Abstract 
The presence of resources in the Arctic, whether discovered or estimated, has encouraged Arctic 
states to scramble for both territory and natural resources. Such potential of undiscovered resources 
within the Arctic has the possibility to worsen existing disputes, or lead to conflicts. It can further 
cause tensions between various Arctic states. The focus of this paper is on the role of two 
international institutions present in the Arctic, the United Nations Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) and 
the Arctic Council, and to determine their efficiency at maintaining peace and facilitating 
cooperation surrounding territorial and resource disputes. The first step is to analyze both 
institutions, with the intention of better understanding their mechanisms. In order to determine 
their efficiency, two case studies will be used. The first is the Barents Sea dispute between Norway 
and Russia. The second is the Beaufort Sea dispute between Canada and the United States. One 
conclusion is found through the analysis of the institutions, and another is found through the two 
case studies. The first is that the Arctic Council, as a cooperation forum focused on environmental 
issues, has been unable to adapt its mandate to one of dispute resolution. It has also been found 
that it is unlikely to adapt itself towards a dispute orientation. The second conclusion is that of the 
mitigated role of UNCLOS within the Arctic, when it comes to dispute resolution. While it has 
been shown to be effective in resolving the Barents Sea dispute, it has had limited success in 
regards to the Beaufort Sea dispute. Ultimately, despite UNCLOS’ limited success, Arctic states 
have shown a desire to cooperate and solve common problems through the assistance of 
institutions. 
  
 
 
 
Résumé 
La présence de ressources dans l'Arctique, qu'elles soient découvertes ou estimées, a encouragé 
les États de l'Arctique à une ruée vers territoire et ressources naturelles. Ce potentiel de ressources 
inconnues dans l'Arctique a la possibilité d'aggraver les différends existants ou de conduire à des 
conflits. Il peut également causer des tensions entre les divers États de l'Arctique. Le présent 
mémoire porte sur le rôle de deux institutions internationales présentes dans l'Arctique, soit la 
Convention des Nations-Unies sur le droit de la mer et sur le Conseil de l'Arctique, notamment sur 
leur efficacité dans le maintien de la paix et la coopération en matière territoriale et de ressources. 
La première étape consiste à analyser les deux institutions, dans le but de mieux comprendre leurs 
mécanismes. Afin de déterminer leur efficacité, deux études de cas seront utilisées. La première 
est la dispute de la mer de Barents entre la Norvège et la Russie. La deuxième est le différend 
relatif à la mer de Beaufort entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Une conclusion est déterminée grâce 
à l'analyse des institutions, et une autre est trouvée par les deux études de cas. La première est que 
le Conseil de l'Arctique, en tant que forum de coopération axé sur les questions environnementales, 
n'a pas été en mesure d'adapter son mandat à celui du règlement des différends. Il a également été 
constaté qu'il est peu probable qu'il s'adapte à l'orientation des différends. La deuxième conclusion 
est celle du rôle mitigé de l'UNCLOS dans l'Arctique, lorsqu'il s'agit de régler les différends. Bien 
qu'il ait été démontré qu'il a été efficace pour résoudre le différend relatif à la mer de Barents, il a 
eu un succès limité en ce qui concerne le différend relatif à la mer de Beaufort. Par contre, malgré 
le succès limité de l'UNCLOS, les États de l'Arctique ont manifesté le désir de coopérer et de 
résoudre les problèmes communs à travers l’assistance des institutions. 
  
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii 
Résumé ........................................................................................................................................... iii 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 
Background ................................................................................................................................. 1 
Research Objectives and Hypothesis .......................................................................................... 3 
Overview ..................................................................................................................................... 4 
Chapter 1: LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY .................................................... 7 
1.1 Literature review ................................................................................................................... 7 
1.1.1 Neoclassical Realism .................................................................................................... 13 
1.1.2 Neoliberalism................................................................................................................ 18 
1.2 Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 21 
1.2.1 Data Collection ............................................................................................................. 22 
1.2.2 Data on Institutions ....................................................................................................... 23 
1.2.3 Data on Disputes ........................................................................................................... 24 
Chapter 2: INSTITUTIONS ......................................................................................................... 27 
2.1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ............................................................. 28 
2.1.1 A Brief History of UNCLOS ........................................................................................ 30 
2.2.2 Dividing the Oceans according to UNCLOS ............................................................... 32 
2.2.3 Dispute Settlement ........................................................................................................ 34 
2.2.4 UNCLOS and CLCS in territorial and resource disputes ............................................. 36 
2.2.5 Ilulissat Declaration ...................................................................................................... 39 
2.2.6 UNCLOS as a Hard Law Institution............................................................................. 42 
2.2 Arctic Council ..................................................................................................................... 42 
2.2.1 History of the Arctic Council ....................................................................................... 45 
2.2.2 Agreements ................................................................................................................... 48 
 
 
 
2.2.3 The Arctic Council’s Role ............................................................................................ 49 
2.2.4 Adapting the Arctic Council to the new reality ............................................................ 51 
2.2.5 The Arctic Council as a Soft Law Institution ............................................................... 54 
Chapter 3: DISPUTES .................................................................................................................. 56 
3.1 Barents Sea .......................................................................................................................... 56 
3.1.1 History and Background of the Dispute ....................................................................... 57 
3.1.2 Agreement Reached ...................................................................................................... 59 
3.1.3 Analysis of UNCLOS’ Role ......................................................................................... 63 
3.2 Beaufort Sea ........................................................................................................................ 67 
3.2.1 History and Background of the Dispute ....................................................................... 70 
3.2.2 Gulf of Maine comparison ............................................................................................ 72 
3.2.3 Current Status ............................................................................................................... 73 
3.2.4 Analysis of potential solutions ..................................................................................... 74 
3.2.5 UNCLOS’ Efficiency ................................................................................................... 76 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 78 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 81 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Climate change is a phenomenon that impacts humanity on a planetary scale. The Arctic, 
despite its remoteness, does not escape this reality. Due to global warming, the region is 
becoming increasingly accessible. Over the last decades, there has been a consistent general 
downtrend of sea-ice extent—the total area of ice—and sea-ice volume.1  
To corroborate this statement, it has been observed that the years 2007 to 2012 were years 
where September sea-ice was considerably lower than both the 1979-2000 average and the 
1979-2010 average.2 The linear rate of decline of sea-ice extent, measured in January 2015, 
was 3.2% per decade.3 In absolute numbers, in 2015, sea-ice extent reached 13.62 million 
square kilometers. In comparison, the 1981-2010 historical average is 14.53 million square 
kilometers. Furthermore, in 2011, sea ice extent had reached a record low, at 14.02 million 
square kilometers4. 
In parallel to this reduction, with its May 2008 survey, the United States Geological Survey 
(USGS) has estimated that the Arctic could hold about 13 percent of the world’s 
undiscovered oil reserve and 30 percent of undiscovered gas reserve. Moreover, the survey 
estimated that 84 percent is expected to be found offshore.5 This reality has the potential to 
lead to an increased interest in the region. On one side, sea-ice extent is reducing, increasing 
accessibility to the Arctic Ocean. On the other side, more and more resources are being found 
offshore of Arctic coasts. While not the only factor, natural resources, including mineral and 
fisheries, are a key aspect of a marked increase in attention given to the Arctic. One perceived 
                                                 
1 National Snow & Ice Data Center. (2012). Arctic Sea Ice Extent Settles at Record Seasonal Minimum. 
Retrieved from http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2012/09/arctic-sea-ice-extent-settles-at-record-seasonal-
minimum/ 
2 Ibid. 
3 National Snow & Ice Data Center. (2015). Arctic Sea Ice News & Analysis. Retrieved from 
http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/ 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ernst & Young Global Limited. (2013). Arctic Oil and Gas. P. 3. Retrieved from 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Arctic_oil_and_gas/$FILE/Arctic_oil_and_gas.pdf 
 and often discussed risk of this greater accessibility coupled with the richness of the Arctic 
is the potential for conflicts over territories rich in natural resources.  
Geographically speaking, while there are numerous definitions of the Arctic, the chosen 
definition is of the Arctic with its boundaries north of the Arctic Circle (66◦ 33’N).6 There 
are eight countries bordering the Arctic: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Russia, Sweden and the United States. However, of these eight countries, only five are Arctic 
littoral states: Canada, Denmark (through Greenland), Norway, Russia and the United States 
(through Alaska).  
In 2007, Russians planted a titanium flag 13,890 feet below the surface, at the North Pole, 
while collecting scientific data to submit a claim for an extension of their continental shelf.7 
This action, which can be interpreted as a catalyst to dispute in the Arctic, is in fact seen by 
most as “part of a carefully planned operation to assert Russia’s claim over part of a region 
that seemed to belong to no one”.8 Russia’s intention in this endeavor was made clear when 
Chilingragov, who is a close confident of President Vladimir Putin, declared “[the] Arctic is 
ours and we should manifest our presence”.9 More than being, at the time, a potential catalyst, 
it was also a symbol of some concerns about Russia, that it would unilaterally lay claims to 
large parts of the Arctic, with no regards to international law. To this action was followed a 
strong international reaction, especially by bordering countries, the act being interpreted as 
threatening.10 
The potential large amounts of resources, the possibility of disputes regarding sovereignty 
and territory, and overlapping claims over extended continental shelf are all factors that can 
potentially shatter the peace that has been ongoing in the Arctic. 
                                                 
6 Bunik, I. V. (2008). Alternative Approaches to the Delimitation of the Arctic Continental Shelf. International 
Energy Law Review, (4),  p. 114 
7 Howard, R. (2009). The Arctic Gold Rush (1st ed.). England: Continnum. P. 2 
8 Ibid. P. 3 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. P. 6 
 Two contending paradigms in international relations will be considered in relations to two 
existing disputes. Specifically, the interest will be on how the disputes have unfurled over 
the years in terms of resolution, or lack thereof.  
On one hand, there is realism, which focuses on state power.11 For the purpose of this thesis, 
the emphasis will be on neoclassical realism. On the other hand, there is liberalism, which is 
presented by Moravcsik as a “social scientific theory of international relations” which aims 
to “explain what states do, not what they should do”.12 Neoliberalism, a strand of liberalism, 
will be studied. 
It is important to understand that realism does not put into question the legitimacy of a state’s 
sovereignty within its own territory. Rather, they see national politics as a “realm of authority 
and law”. Realism is solely focused on international politics. It is that sphere that realists 
claim that is without justice, and “characterized by active or potential conflict among 
states”.13 
 
Research Objectives and Hypothesis 
The possibility of disputes within the Arctic should not be ignored. There are currently 
territorial claims in the Arctic that could have important natural resource implications, which 
in turn could potentially lead to disputes. The aim of this thesis is to analyze whether the 
institutions present in the Arctic are sufficient to maintain the existing peace. Based on the 
neoliberal paradigm, we can expect that they are. In contrast, based on the neoclassical 
realism paradigm, we can expect the opposite. In this case, we are to assume that there is 
potential dispute escalation. 
                                                 
11 Donnelly, J. The Ethics of Realism. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008, p. 150 
12 Moravcsik, A. (n.d.). Liberalism and International Relations Theory. Harvard University and University of 
Chicago, (92-6) 
13 Korab-Karpowicz, W. J. (2013). Political Realism in International Relations. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=realism-intl-
relations 
 
 To analyze whether the institutions are efficient or not, this thesis intends to answer the 
following question: In light of the existing disputes regarding territorial claims in the Arctic, 
can we find the institutions present in the Arctic, in this case UNCLOS and the Arctic 
Council, to be efficient in safeguarding the existing peace in the region through dispute 
resolution? 
The working hypothesis of this paper is that the institutions present—namely UNCLOS as a 
hard law institution and the Arctic Council as a soft law institution—are sufficient in 
resolving on-going disputes in the Arctic and preventing new disputes from escalating. It is 
believed that UNCLOS, as per its role and its provisions for settlement of disputes, combined 
with the positive influence of the Arctic Council on Arctic cooperation, are sufficient in 
attaining dispute resolution. 
 
Overview 
This thesis will be divided into four chapters. The first one will be literature review and the 
methodology. The second will be dedicated to the institutions under study, UNCLOS and the 
Arctic Council. The third chapter will be devoted to the disputes themselves, and include the 
in-depth analysis. The fourth chapter will be the conclusion. 
The first chapter will be divided into two different sections. The first section will be on the 
literature review. The literature review will introduce and expand on both theories. It will 
also define key concepts found within the hypothesis. The literature review will be linked to 
the working hypothesis of this paper. To achieve this aim, an emphasis will be put on how 
disputes and institutions are seen from both standpoints. This section will act as a guideline 
through the research, especially through data collection and analysis. The second part of this 
section will be to describe the chosen methodology. The methodology will be chosen in 
accordance to the verification of the hypothesis. The chosen disputes will be studied with the 
lens of neoclassical realism and neoliberalism, with an emphasis on either how effective the 
institutions have been in resolving the dispute (in the case of the Barents Sea), or its 
limitations with the other one (the Beaufort Sea). 
 The second chapter will be the foundation for the analysis, and it will be divided into two 
sections. It will address both institutions, UNCLOS and the Arctic Council. The first section 
will emphasize on UNCLOS, and the second on the Arctic Council. As this thesis is on the 
Arctic, the emphasis on UNCLOS will be in regards to its implication for the region. In both 
cases, a brief history of the institutions will be detailed, followed by a description of their 
mechanisms and scopes. A particular interest will be put on dispute resolution dispositions 
for the former, and the ability to foster cooperation for the latter. The applicability for the 
Arctic will be explored (in UNCLOS’ case), as well as their impacts in the region, their 
contribution in building the current Arctic peace, and their limitations. This section will not 
be specific to the disputes themselves; rather, it will study general mechanisms to resolve 
disputes, including institution’s role in fostering peace and encouraging diplomatic relations. 
Its aim is to give insights as to how they are sufficient to regulate disputes of the magnitude 
of the Beaufort and Barents Sea. It is crucial to better understand the disputes that will be 
studied, in order to assess their impacts, both real and potential, and their limitations. Given 
that the hypothesis aims to validate that the institutions are sufficient in maintaining the peace 
within the Arctic, an emphasis will be put on the dispute dimension. As such, UNCLOS’ 
dispute settlement will be studied in-depth in order to provide a better understanding of the 
various mechanisms at play. As for the Arctic Council, the interest will be put on its role as 
a mediator.  
The third chapter will be the core of the study, as it will be entirely dedicated to the disputes 
under study, the Barents and Beaufort Sea, and the Gulf of Maine. It will also be divided into 
three sections, one per disputes. As per the institutions, the first step will be to trace the 
history of the disputes. However, in this case, it will be more detailed, as it will prove 
significantly important in understanding them. In turn this will prove important in 
understanding, in the Barents Sea and Gulf of Maine’s case, how it was resolved, and in the 
Beaufort Sea’s case, why it hasn’t. It will also permit an understanding of the similarities and 
differences between the disputes. While tracing its history, a particular interest will be given 
in how the institutions have shaped the disputes and aided in either the resolution, or in 
reaching a temporary consensus. The first two disputes to be analyzed are those that have 
 been resolved (Barents Sea and Gulf of Maine). The analysis will relate to the one of the 
institutions, in order to determine how (if) their provisions have helped in any form the 
countries to settle their dispute and come to an agreement. A similar analysis will be done 
with the Beaufort Sea, constantly linking to both institutions. However, other factors of 
importance that have assisted or hindered in reaching a consensus acceptable by the countries 
will equally be considered. The disputes will equally be compared, not in term of their nature, 
but rather in term of dispute resolution. This will serve order to determine whether the 
Barents Sea and Gulf of Maine disputes can act as guides for the Beaufort Sea ongoing 
dispute. Ultimately, the analysis of the disputes will permit to verify the hypothesis, and 
determine whether the institutions by themselves are sufficient in maintaining the current 
peace within the Arctic. 
The fourth and final chapter will serve as the conclusion. There will be a summary of the two 
disputes in the Arctic and of the Gulf of Maine, and the roles that the institutions played. 
Recommendations will also be explored in regards to the Beaufort Sea dispute.  
  
 Chapter 1: LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
1.1 Literature review 
By scanning existing literature on the Arctic, the Barents Sea dispute and the Beaufort Sea 
dispute, as well as other disputes present in the Arctic, two contrasting points of view become 
apparent. One tends to be more pessimistic about the state of affairs in the region, while one 
tends to be more optimistic. That is, one tends to believe that current institutions are 
insufficient in resolving ongoing disputes, while the other believe that they are. 
Dodds, in the abstract of his paper ‘Squaring the Circle: The Arctic States, “Law of the Sea”, 
And the Arctic Ocean’ (2014), resumes well the two current positions in existing literature. 
One vision is that of a ‘scramble for resources and territory’, while the other rejects it, with 
the beliefs that current institutions are able to mediate current disputes—as well as potential 
new ones.14 
Rothwell, professor of international law, argues in his paper ‘The Arctic in International Law: 
Time for a New Regime?’ (2008) that the timing, due to current circumstances in the Arctic, 
is right for the development of an Arctic Treaty similar to that of Antarctica.15 Holmes, in 
her paper ‘Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic Sovereignty” (2008) also 
conclude that overlapping claims would be better handled by an overarching treaty similar to 
that of the Antarctic Treaty.16 The author arrives to this conclusion by arguing that UNCLOS 
is unsuitable as an institution in managing disputes in the Arctic.17 Carpenter, in his paper 
‘Warm is the New Cold: Global Warming, Oil, UNCLOS Article 76, and how an Arctic 
Treaty Might Stop a New Cold War further argues of UNCLOS’ inefficiency, stating it to be 
powerless in a case where a state refuses to acknowledge a decision rendered by the 
institution. The author further argues that because of this inability, and because of 
                                                 
14 Dodds, K. (2014). Squaring the Circle: The Arctic States, “Law of the Sea,” and the Arctic Ocean. Eurasia 
Border Review, 5(1), p. 113. 
15 Rothwell, D. R. (2008). The Arctic in International Affairs: Time for a New Regime? The Australian National 
University, 8(37), p. 8. 
16 Holmes, S. (2008). Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic Sovereignty. Chicago Journal of 
International Law, 9(1), p. 351 
17 Ibid, p. 325 
 overlapping territorial claims, “the specter of armed conflict […] looms over an already dire 
situation”.18 Emmerson, senior research fellow at Chatham House, supports that the main 
reason the Barents Sea dispute was resolved was not because of UNCLOS’ assistance. He 
offers that it was mainly resolved due to economic incentive, mainly the presence of oil and 
gas.19 
It is not solely scholars who tend to have a more pessimistic view of the state of affairs in the 
Arctic. A general consensus of the pessimistic view is a ‘rush for resources’. The European 
Union made a suggestion, in 2008, that an Arctic Treaty be developed, using the 1959 
Antarctic treaty as an inspiration.20 Other commentators, such as the author Ed Struzik, have 
also argued in favor of an overarching treaty to aid in Arctic governance.21  
Others in the literature do not necessarily argue for the creation of an Arctic Treaty similar 
to the Antarctic Treaty, but do recognize certain limitations in current Arctic institutions, 
mainly in the Arctic Council. Keil, Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute, questions the 
efficiency of the Arctic Council in her text written for the think tank.22 In another paper, she 
argues that the likelihood of geopolitical scramble for resources is unlikely, and in parallel, 
brings forth the potential challenges to be faced by Arctic institutions in environmental 
protection.23 In their paper “The effectiveness of the Arctic Council” (2012), Kankaanpää 
and Young have a slightly more ambiguous view of the Arctic Council. They argue that while 
the Council has had success in the past, it now requires adjustments in order to remain 
relevant and effective in current Arctic affairs.24 Pederson argues that Arctic states remain 
                                                 
18 Carpenter, B. (2009). Warm is the New Cold: Global Warming, Oil, UNCLOS Article 76, and how an Arctic 
Treaty Might Stop a New Cold War. Environmental Law, 39(215), P. 239 
19 Emmerson, C. (2010, September 29). Our friends in the north. Russia Beyond the Headlines. Russia. 
20 European Parliament. (2008). European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance. 
Brussels 
21 Struzik, E. (2010, June). As the Far North Melts, Calls Grow for Arctic Treaty. Yale Environment 360. 
Retrieved from http://e360.yale.edu/feature/as_the_far_north_melts_calls_grow_for_arctic_treaty/2281/ 
22 Keil, K. (2014). A New Model for International Cooperation. The Arctic Institute. 
23 Keil, K. (2013). The Arctic: A New Region of Conflict? The case of oil and gas. Cooperation and Conflict, 
0(0), 1-29 
24 Kankaanpää, P., & Young, O. R. (2012). The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council. Polar Research, 31, 
 unlikely to strengthen the Arctic Council’s mandate, which could potentially dilute its 
influence over the years.25 
The contrasting point of view to the scramble for resources is that of efficient institutions in 
managing disputes in the region. A text by an unnamed author in the Strategic Comments 
publications, ‘Growing Importance of the Arctic Council’ (2013) argues for just what the 
title states: That the Arctic Council’s role in the region is expanding in light of increasing 
interest in the region.26 Similar positive sentiments towards UNCLOS can be found in the 
literature. As it is argued in the paper ‘Scramble for the Arctic: Layered Sovereignty, 
UNCLOS, and Competing Maritime Territorial Claims’ (2013), UNCLOS is (1) sufficient to 
delegitimize traditional power-politics involved in disputes; (2) sufficient to handle such 
disputes; and (3) its role has yet to be challenged by the Arctic states. In short, UNCLOS 
enjoys recognition and acceptance as the framework for “establishing, defining, deciding and 
resolving disputes on maritime territorial issues”.27  
Other authors tend agree with this statement. In their analysis of the Barents Sea dispute, 
Moe, Fjærtoft and øverland acknowledge that while no individual factor can, by itself, 
explain the dispute resolution, UNCLOS played a significant role.28 Literature on the 
Beaufort Sea, the unresolved dispute studied in this paper, also supports the view that 
institutions are sufficient in regulating disputes in the Arctic. In her paper, Baker notes that 
while calls for an overarching treaty in the Arctic continues from certain, there is a general 
consensus from both academics and policymakers that such a treaty is not presently 
necessary.29 
                                                 
25 Pedersen, T. (2012). Debates over the Role of the Arctic Council. Ocean Development & International Law, 
43(2), p. 154 
26 Growing importance of the Arctic Council. (2013). Strategic Comments, 19(16), 2. 
27 Carlson, J. D., Hubach, C., Long, J., Minteer, K., & Young, S. (2013). Scramble for the Arctic: Layered 
Sovereignty, UNCLOS, and Competing Maritime Territorial Claims. SAIS Review, 33(2), p. 41 
28 Moe, A., Fjaertoft, D., & Overland, I. (2011). Space and timing: why was the Barents Sea delimitation dispute 
resolved in 2010? Polar Geography, 34(3), p. 156 
29 Baker, B. (2009). Filling an Arctic Gap: Legal and Regulatory Possibilities for Canadian-U.S. Cooperation 
in the Beaufort Sea. Vermont Law Review, 34(057), p. 60 
 Other authors have a more neutral approach, giving weight to both UNCLOS as an institution 
and to external factors in explaining how disputes have been resolved or may be resolved in 
the future. Henriksen and Ulfstein recognize the potential role that UNCLOS played in the 
Barents Sea dispute resolution by acting as a guide in establishing a delimitation line in the 
disputed territory.30 They further argue that the new accessibility of the region to maritime 
transport and natural resources were also influential factors in the resolution of the dispute.31 
Konyshev and Sergunin remark, in ‘Russia’s Policies on the Territorial Disputes in the 
Arctic’ (2014), of Russia’s emphasis of UNCLOS’s key role in the Arctic. They also note 
that economic incentives were crucial in resolving the Barents Sea dispute.32From the 
literature, it becomes evident that neoclassical realism and neoliberalism views of the state 
of the Arctic region—both current and future—are predominant. Both theories interpret 
current Arctic affairs differently. The former as a potential scramble for resource and 
territory, while the latter as an arena of cooperation due to the influence of existing 
institutions. Despite conflicting views, both sides agree on the underlying assumption of 
increased international attention in the region, namely in its potential for resources. 
Because of this existing contrast between scholar opinions on the topic, it becomes pertinent 
to analyze the disputes from two theoretical frameworks which relate to the general beliefs 
and opinions on the state of affairs within the region. For those who tend to be optimist, it 
has been found that they tend to believe that the institutions active within the Arctic sphere 
are sufficient in regulating current disputes, and preventing new ones for arising. They do 
not believe that more needs to be done. This relates to one of the theoretical framework that 
will be used in this paper, which is neoliberalism. For those who tend to be pessimistic, they 
tend to argue that institutions are—and will be, in their current state—unable to prevent a 
geopolitical scramble for territory and resources. Such scramble is core to the realist model 
of states seeking control over territory and vital resources as a defensive mechanism.  
                                                 
30 Ulfstein, G., & Henriksen, T. (2011). Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty. Ocean 
Development & International Law, 42(1), p. 6 
31 Ibid. p. 10 
32 Konyshev, V., & Sergunin, A. (2014). Russia’s Policies on the Territorial Disputes in the Arctic. Journal of 
International Relations and Foreign Policy, 2(1), p. 80 
 This paper’s analysis will be done with the help of the two aforementioned theoretical 
frameworks, which are two contending theories in International Relations. They are 
neoclassical realism, which is a strand of realism, and neoliberalism—or liberal 
institutionalism—a strand of liberalism. It is important to note that while neoliberalism can 
be seen as a continuation of liberalism, it is equally, in some respects, similar to neorealism. 
As Keohane states, liberal institutionalism “borrows as much from realism as liberalism”.33  
There is a long-standing academic rivalry between the two schools of thoughts, between 
“idealist theories and realist facts”34. The rivalry is clearly brought to light by the 
aforementioned quote, biased towards the realism ideology. This rivalry is equally present in 
multiple spheres. For example, mercantilism does not escape opposition of ideologies; 
according to a scholar of international political economy, Robert Gilpin, “politics determines 
economics”, while the liberal counterpart, which is normative in nature, states that 
“economics should determine politics”.35  
Prior to analyzing both theories, it is essential to define the key concepts found in the 
hypothesis. The concepts to define are those of disputes, conflict (to serve as a contrast), 
dispute resolution, and peace. 
The definition of dispute can be quite ambiguous at times, and recognizing a dispute can be 
equally difficult. In fact, the existence of a dispute may itself be disputed by any of the 
concerned parties.36 The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) defines a dispute 
as: “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between 
two persons”, while the International Court of Justice (ICJ) defines it as “a situation in which 
the two sides held clearly opposite views concerning the questions of the performance or 
                                                 
33 Baldwin, D. A. (1993). Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
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 non-performance of certain treaty obligations”.37 In his paper ‘What is a Legal Dispute?’ 
(2008), Schrewer concludes that a dispute must be in relation to identified issues and must 
have specific consequences. He does not conclude that actual damage is necessary for a 
dispute to exist, simply that the dispute itself be relevant.38 
Conflict can be defined in terms of the actions, wants, needs or even obligations of the various 
parties at play. A conflict will arise due to mutually exclusive acts, wants, needs or 
obligations.39 Nicholson, in his book “Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict” 
(1992) differentiates between conflict behaviour, disagreement, conflict of interests—or 
simply as ‘a conflict exists’. Conflict behaviour is when two parties are in a conflict and are 
devoting resources to damage the other, with the intention of inducing a favorable settlement 
for themselves. In contrast, a conflict of interest is a situation of incompatibility between two 
parties that could potentially lead to conflict behaviour. A disagreement is when the parties 
are unwilling to use conflict behaviour to solve an issue.40  
When comparing the definition if dispute to the multiple definitions of conflict, similarities 
and differences arise. Conflict behaviour is of a greater magnitude than a dispute, as there 
are attempts for parties to damage one another. However, in both the case of a conflict of 
interest and of a disagreement, there is no such action. As such, these definition are much 
closer to the definition of dispute than is the one of conflict behaviour. 
The United Nations issued, in 1988, a Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 
between States. This guide was meant to be descriptive rather than used as a legal instrument. 
Its purpose is to assist states in reaching peaceful settlements of disputes. The Handbook lists 
many ways in which a dispute may be resolved, such as negotiations, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement and other peaceful means.41  
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 For the purpose of this thesis, the chosen definition of peace is the operational definition 
given by Anderson (2004). It is defined as a political condition of "low levels of violence and 
mutually harmonious relationships.”42 This definition combines both negative peace, which 
is seen as a lack of violence, and positive peace, which focuses on harmony. Peace can be 
achieved either through institutions, practices or norms between parties. Based on this 
definition, it is more than an absence of war, hostilities or the avoidance of conflict. A lack 
of conflict does not necessarily translate into harmonious relations between states. 
 
1.1.1 Neoclassical Realism 
In today’s literature, there are a variety of different strands of realism sharing some 
fundamental ideas, which are the anarchic state of the international system, and the primacy 
of the state. These two postulates lead to power politics, wherein the priority for states is the 
pursuit of power. This pursuit of power is one which dwarfs all other objectives.43 
Classical realism bases its theories off of five assumptions, which are: (1) the anarchic 
international system; (2) the offensive military capability of each states; (3) uncertainty of 
the actions and intentions of other states; (4) the basic motive—the primal motive—is 
survival; and (5) states are strategic in their goal to survive.44 These assumptions, while 
pessimistic, tend to give the impression that states will act defensively (i.e.: with the intension 
to survive), rather than aggressively. However, when taken as a whole, they can create the 
incentive for them to become belligerent. 
There are two major realist interpretations of international affairs, classified as state-centric 
and system-centric.45 The former, also deemed ‘classical realism’, is associated with 
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 Thuclydes—namely, the Melian Dialogue, which serves as the roots of realism46—, with 
Machiavelli, and with Hans Morgenthau, among others.  
Morgenthau systemized his analysis of realism by creating six principles, which can be found 
in Politics among Nations. His main postulate, which is found in the first principle, is that 
politics is guided by human nature. Once this postulate is established, he moves to his second 
principle, which is the lighthouse guiding his theory through international politics; the 
concept of power. It is the concept of “interest defined in terms of power”47. This notion 
enables politics to become an autonomous sphere of action. Combining the first two concepts, 
it can be concluded that, according to Morgenthau, statesmen “think and act in terms of 
interest defined as power”.48 In turn, the supremacy of ‘desire for power’ allows for an 
analysis of a state’s foreign policy despite the motives and intentions of statesmen. That is to 
say, the desire for power, in international politics, trumps all other human emotions.49 
System-centric realism is also called structural realism or neorealism. Its main postulates are 
based on classical realism. They are, however, reformulated and adapted accordingly. It 
focuses less on human nature and tends to shy away from states and their domestic policies, 
rather focusing more on the international system. Consequently, neorealists put an emphasis 
on the anarchy of the system, and distribution of power. However, rather than seeing power 
as both a means and an end, “neorealists assume that the fundamental interest of each state 
is security and would therefore concentrate on the distribution of power.”50  
A fundamental difference between the two branches is the underlying factor explaining the 
desire for power. Classical realism dictates that it is due to human nature. Neorealism, 
dissociating itself from the human factor, needs a different cause. The theory believes that it 
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 stems solely from the anarchic state of the international system.51 Power becomes a defense 
mechanism, serving as a deterrent from potential attacks, but also as a means to defend itself 
against actual attacks. 
For the purpose of this thesis, there will not be a focus on neorealism; rather, it will be placed 
on neoclassical realism. Neoclassical can be seen as going back to the roots of realism 
(classical), while expanding the scope of study (neo). It was coined by Gideon Rose in his 
1998 article, published in ‘World Politics’. For neoclassic realists, Thucydide’s observation 
remains true: “The strong do what they have the power to and the weak accept what they 
have to accept”.52 Furthermore, neoclassical realists argue that the “scope and ambition of a 
country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system 
and specifically by its relative material power capabilities.”53 This is the ‘realist’ aspect of 
their model.  
Neoclassical realists argue that a state’s foreign policy will be in accordance to both its place 
in the international system and by its relative power capabilities. They also argue that a 
country’s relative power—by which is implied economic, military and political power—will 
influence the country’s position in the international system. The systemic variable—a state’s 
vulnerability due to the anarchy of the international system—has primacy. 
They do, however, acknowledge that the link between relative power and a country’s foreign 
policy is less than direct, and quite complex, because “systemic pressures must be translated 
through intervening variables at the unit level”.54 Neoclassical realism acknowledges that 
there is more than the state as the sole actor in International Relations. This is the 
‘neoclassical’ aspect of the model.  
Among these intervening variables, the theory argues that as choices are made by foreign 
policy leaders, and that it is their perception of relative power that matters. It also argue that 
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 state structure will have an effect on how they act, relative power being equal. Proponents of 
neoclassical realism believe that in order to understand the relationship between power and 
foreign policy, the context remains crucial and must be examined.  
Consequently, neoclassical realism argues that a state’s action is explained by three variables. 
On one hand, there are systemic variables, such as relative power. On the other hand, there 
are cognitive variables, such as leader’s perception of relative power of other states, and their 
intentions. Last, there are domestic variables, such as the state structure.55  
The causal logic of neoclassical realism is seen as such: The independent variable are 
systemic incentives—the international system—while the intervening variables are internal 
factors affecting power perception. A change in the independent variable will have an effect 
on the intervening variables, which will in turn affect the dependent variable, which is the 
foreign policy. It is a three-step causal chain: (1) the independent variable, exogenous to the 
state, is the relative power of a country in the anarchic international system; (2) the 
intervening variables, endogenous to the state, act as a transmission belt, filtering how the 
independent variable is analyzed; and (3) the dependent variable, in this case the foreign 
policy, is the outcome. 
“Neoclassical realism posits an imperfect “transmission belt” between systemic incentives 
and constraints, on the one hand, and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic 
policies states select, on the other.”56 This relates to the complexity between relative power 
and foreign policy, due to intervening variables—the internal factors related to perception of 
power, as previously mentioned. According to neoclassical realists, while in the short term 
policies tend to be inefficient or unpredictable, in the long term, policies traditionally mirror 
the distribution of power among states.57  
Given this imperfect transmission belt, and the importance of intervening variables, ideas 
must be treated as elements of power. They are elements of power for two reason: (1) by their 
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 nature; and (2) based on the individual/institution holding that idea. 58 Furthermore, ideas can 
influence at multiple levels: “through […] specific individuals; […] through institutions; and 
through the broader culture of the state.”59 The key level, in the context of this thesis, are 
‘institutions’. Institutions are shaper of ideas, and can influence the dependant variable, that 
is, the state’s foreign policy. They can play a further role in promoting an idea, in three ways: 
(1) through the influence of a group of expert within it; (2) by encasing the idea in formal 
rules within the institution itself; and (3) through structural arrangements created by the 
institutions, determining how easily—or difficulty—an idea can reach the policy process.60 
For neoclassical realists, just as ideas play a crucial role in foreign policy, conflicts are 
equally important. States and their leaders have an incentive to shift their resources from 
societal consumption to security consumption. While this holds true for any state, it varies 
from one to another, based on the leader’s perception of its relative power in contrast to the 
international system. In turn, when a state’s power grows, its relative power equally grows, 
affecting its foreign policy.61 Equally, this will affect the state’s military spending. 
Notwithstanding a state’s desire to expand its military, society can act as an impediment, 
desiring to see more spending in societal consumption rather than military. A state has to 
“convince” society to spend; it can “coerce society into spending [and] can also try 
persuasion.”62 Mobilization becomes important, and nationalism is used as a tool, just as 
conflicts, which creates an “other” or an “adversary” with threatening policies. Adversaries 
are therefore another useful tool for mobilization.63 
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 1.1.2 Neoliberalism 
While realism can find its origins in Machiavelli, liberalism can find its own in the German 
philosopher, Immanuel Kant. Kant has said: 
“The homage which each state pays (at least in words) to the concept of 
law proves that there is slumbering in man an even greater moral 
disposition to become master of the evil principle in himself (which he 
cannot disclaim) and to hope for the same from others...For these 
reasons there must be a league of a particular kind, which can be called 
a league of peace (foedus pacificum), and which would be distinguished 
from a treaty of peace (pactum pacis) by the fact that the latter terminates 
only one war, while the former seeks to make an end of all wars forever.”  
This quote shows a more optimistic view of the international system, and shows the 
liberalism ideology’s desire for “perpetual peace”. While realism argues that a state seeks to 
maximize its security as a response to various incentives, liberalism argues that the 
international system, despite its anarchic state and potential for conflict, fosters the possibility 
for cooperation. Realism views the states as the only actors in the international system; 
neorealism even dissociates itself from the human factor. Liberalism does not agree with this 
postulate, arguing they are one of multiple actors—other actors can be institutions, such as 
non-governmental organizations (NGO) and international organizations, but also multi-
national corporations and military alliances.64 
Liberalism contrasts realism by putting a larger importance on cooperation and international 
institutions. This cooperation can be achieved through various means, such as agreements 
between different parties, consequently reducing the risk for stakeholders. In other words, 
cooperation is achieved through “mutual threat reduction”.65 This is the concept of common 
security, that security must be aimed as a cooperative measure between states, rather than 
one against all. Common security is the answer to the security dilemma, where actions taken 
by a state to increase its defensive abilities can lead to reciprocate measures from other states.  
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 Kegley and Shannon’s description and definition of liberalism can further be seen as 
opposing realism. For them, the paradigm of liberalism is established on the ideologies of 
reason, ethics and justice, which can lead to “a more orderly, just and cooperative world”.66 
They further argue that it is a liberal’s desire that the world’s anarchic state can be policed 
by institutional reforms which would “empower international organizations and law.”67 To 
further emphasize this point, Doyle observes that there tends to be a peaceful restraint 
between liberal states. However, this restraint seems to disappear when considering the 
relations between a liberal and non-liberal state.68 One reason proposed for this observation 
is the suspicion that the liberal state will have towards the non-liberal state. 
The strand of liberalism that is of interest for this thesis, neoliberalism, does not dispute 
neoclassical realism’s main assumption, which is the anarchic state of the international 
system. In fact, neoliberalism acknowledges such anarchy, and further argues that 
“international regimes can facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty”.69 A reduction in 
uncertainty will, in turn, augment the likelihood of cooperation between states. Proponents 
of the neoliberal theory believe that regimes help actors in world politics “to make mutually 
beneficial agreements that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to attain”.70  
Keohane, a proponent of neoliberal institutionalism, argues that, despite the postulates of 
realism, there is a logical fallacy in assuming an impossibility of accordance and cooperation 
in the international system. Governments, notwithstanding their egoistical nature, and 
regardless of the anarchic state of the international system, can “rationally seek to form 
international regimes on the basis of shared interest”.71 Neoliberals emphasize mutual 
benefits and mutual gains, and view institutions as facilitators of such compromise, 
augmenting the capability of trust between states. To further emphasize this concept, Krasner 
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 argues that the basic function of regimes is to act as coordination-facilitator in state 
behaviour.72 
There are certain elements that can impede such aim. For example, like previously noted, 
liberal states can become suspicious of non-liberal states. This sense of suspicion can lead to 
“restrictions on the range of contacts between societies, [which can in turn] increase the 
prospect that a single conflict will determine an entire relationship”.73 Another example, 
relevant to the Arctic, is extreme scarcity. Moravcsik indicates that extreme scarcity tends to 
worsen potential conflicts over resources, since implicated actors will be more willing to 
assume the cost and risk to obtain them. In contrast, abundance reduces the odds of conflict 
over a resource.74 
However, despite scarcity, institutions have a positive influence in aiding states to develop 
agreements to “organize and govern themselves to obtain continuing joint benefits when all 
face temptations to free-ride, shirk, or otherwise act opportunistically”.75 
A common topic of dissent in international relations, which divides neoliberal 
institutionalism and classical realism, is the concept of relative and absolute gains. Neoliberal 
institutionalists believe that states focus more on absolute gains, while realists believe that 
states focus more on relative gains. Focusing on absolute gains, argue the former, foster the 
possibility for cooperation, while focusing on relative gains, argue the latter, inhibit that 
possibility. 76 
Neoliberalism argues that the aim of relative gains acts as an inhibitor for international 
cooperation. The theory believes, however, that institutions can help reduce this. By its 
definition, an institution, is a “persistent and connected sets of rules, often affiliated with 
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 organizations that operate across international boundaries”.77 They believe that institutions 
can positively impact strategies sought by states to achieve international security, nullifying 
the fear of relative gains, which in turn encourages cooperation. Proponents of this theory 
argue that international institutions, and their stability, will determine how important the 
consideration for relative gains is. The more stable the institution is, they contend, the less 
states would be worried about relative gains.78  
To further the neoliberal argument, they also offer that states, being only concerned in their 
individual absolute gains, are indifferent to the gains of other states. As for cheating, they do 
agree with the realist standpoint that it is in inhibitor to cooperation. Cheating is suggested 
by the neoliberal institutionalism theory to be the most important inhibition of cooperation 
among “rationally egoistic state”.79 The theory argues, however, that international 
institutions help state bypass this fear of cheating, which in turn promotes cooperation. To 
quote Keohane, “in general, regimes make it more sensible to cooperate by lowering the 
likelihood of being double-crossed”.80 
 
1.2 Methodology 
The qualitative case study method is the chosen approach to examine the role of the 
institutions, and to understand how they played a part in the evolution of the disputes. As 
described by Baxter and Jack (2008), it will enable a better understanding of the cases and 
their contextual conditions by using multiple data sources. Multiple information canals will 
be used to offer a better, multidimensional understanding of the disputes being studied. 81 
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 While the Arctic itself is not a new arena of interest, certain concepts of Arctic cooperation 
in an ever-changing climate setting are relatively new. The Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy (AEPS) is the precursor of the Arctic Council. It marked the beginning of 
international cooperation in the Arctic in that sphere as the states became aware of the 
climatic impact on the region. This Strategy has seen the light in 1991, less than 25 years 
ago. The Arctic Council dates from 1996, less than 20 years ago. Although there has been a 
longstanding interest in the Arctic, as the decade-old Barents Sea dispute between Norway 
and Russia shows, it’s only recently that the attention that the Arctic has been getting lately 
has grown exponentially. One direct consequence for research on the matter is that there is a 
scarcity of certain types of documents. For example, in the case of the Arctic Council, 
Council Declarations are only made on a two-year basis. The United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) itself, on the other hand, is less recent. It dates from 1982, 
and is also more universal. Thus it gives access to a larger scope of documents, studies and 
reports. 
The emphasis will be on secondary data rather than primary data. It will be used in order to 
validate the plausibility of the hypothesis. The data used will focus on written and scholarly 
articles on the subject of the Arctic. However, it will not be limited to scientific papers. Other 
sources of data will be used to complement, such as the institutions’ charters, think-tank 
articles, newspaper articles, maps, official reports from governmental agencies or from non-
governmental organizations (NGO), and any other sources deemed necessary. The Arctic 
policies of the four Arctic coastal states concerned by the disputes under study (Canada, 
Norway, Russia and the United States) will also be duly considered. 
 
1.2.1 Data Collection 
There are two main chapters: one on institutions, and one on disputes. Each are divided into 
the two institutions and the three disputes. For both institutions the first step will be general 
data collection, and then there will be more specific information. The inclusion criteria for 
the general data will be on the history of both institutions and information pertaining to their 
 structure, organization and mandates. Following this, specific data will be gathered for both. 
For UNCLOS, the inclusion criteria will be data relating to both: (1) its dispute resolution 
dispositions; and (2) the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). As 
for the Arctic Council, the inclusion criteria will be: (1) the agreements it has enabled its 
member states ratify; and (2) its limiting factors in terms of adapting into an institution with 
dispute resolution mechanisms. Four limiting factors and their impacts have been chosen: (1) 
environmental physical changes; (2) increased economic interest in the region; (3) the 
incorporation of observer states within the council; and (4) the disagreements as per its 
structure and mandates. 
As for the disputes, the data of interest will be similar for them. In all cases, the first step will 
be gathering facts on their historical aspects in order to better understand the context. 
Different facets of the history of the disputes will be considered: (1) The events prior to the 
disputes; (2) the beginning of the disputes themselves; and (3) the progress made throughout 
the dispute’s existence through negotiation and diplomacy, with a particular interest in the 
role of UNCLOS and the Arctic Council (for the Beaufort and Barents Sea Dispute). At this 
point, the data collection will differ between the disputes, given that two are resolved and the 
other is not. For the Barents Sea and the Gulf of Maine, information will be gathered about 
how the agreement was reached, which factors have aided in such resolution, as well as why 
it was reached. For the Beaufort Sea, the data will focus on the current state of the dispute, 
and potential future developments. 
 
1.2.2 Data on Institutions 
Once the data has been collected, the role of both institutions will be explored through it. 
This will differ from one to the other given the differing mandates and statuses of both 
institutions within the Arctic.  
Starting with the Arctic Council, we will begin by exploring the institution. As stated by 
Samuel Barkin, the first step in researching and better understanding an international 
 organization is its institutional analysis.82 It consists of “the formal structure, organization, 
and bureaucratic hierarchy of IOs”83, with the charter as the starting point. In this case, an 
institutional analysis will not be conducted, but a similar approach will be used to better 
understand the Council. 
Typically, as it is the case with the Arctic Council, the charter will specify key attributes of 
the institution. They are its structure, powers, decision-making processes and hierarchy. 
Furthermore, of particular interest will be both the agreements ratified with its assistance and 
the abovementioned limiting factors. The aim is to determine whether the Council has 
adapted itself from a regime with an environmental focus to one with a broader mandate that 
encompasses disputes. Doing so will permit to determine whether this institution will be 
considered when verifying the hypothesis. 
As for UNCLOS, specific attention will be paid to its mechanisms and dispute resolution 
dispositions. The emphasis will be on both the dispute resolution provisions themselves and 
CLCS.  Detailed study of the mechanisms at play will be made, including how they have the 
potential to influence the disputes. At this stage, there will be no attempt at validating the 
hypothesis. Rather, the interest will be in better understanding how the institution can play a 
role in dispute resolution. This understanding, ultimately, will be used to establish UNCLOS’ 
efficiency in dispute resolution in the third chapter, by putting emphasis on the role and 
impact that its provisions have played as the disputes have unfurled over the years.  
 
1.2.3 Data on Disputes 
The information from institution will be used to better understand the chosen disputes. An 
emphasis will be put on how both institutions have aided in resolving the disputes, and their 
shortcomings. The data studied will be on the Barents and Beaufort Sea disputes, and the 
Gulf of Maine to act as a comparative example to the Beaufort Sea. The history of the disputes 
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 will be thoroughly researched and a particular interest will be on the role played by the 
institutions.  
The disputes in the Arctic have important differences. A first are the nature of the Norwegian-
Russian relations, in contrast to the American-Canadian relations. A second is the fact that 
the Americans have yet to ratify UNCLOS. However, there are also some important 
similarities, which explain the selection. Both areas are home to important deposits of oil. 
First in the case of the Barents Sea, Russia estimates that petroleum resources could be 
equivalent to either 39 billion barrels of oil or 6.6 trillion cubic meters of gas or a blend of 
the two.84 As for the Beaufort Sea, it has been known as far back as the 1970s to contain 
hydrocarbons. Concretely, in 2006, a potential 250 million barrels were discovered by Devon 
Canada.85 The second similarity is that both disputes have been ongoing for decades. 
Furthermore, the nature of the dispute is equally comparable; in both cases the dispute arises 
from a disagreement in which boundary delimitation line is used.86 
The starting point will be a brief historical and context background research of the disputes. 
Following this, the focus will be on the extent to which the institutions have impacted the 
resolution of the Barents Sea and the Gulf of Maine disputes, or assisted in achieving progress 
in the Beaufort Sea dispute. To do so, a consistent approach for the disputes will be employed, 
by exploring (1)  the issues as well as the claims and arguments of the involved parties; (2) 
the decision making process of the disputes including the role of the institutions, both direct 
and indirect; (3) the outcome of the resolution of the Barents Sea and the Gulf of Maine 
dispute and the current state of the second dispute. Finally, it will be determined whether the 
hypothesis is to be accepted or rejected. This decision will be based on the perceived role of 
the institutions. If the institutions had an influential and decisive role in the resolution of 
disputes, then the hypothesis will not be rejected. 
                                                 
84 Weafer, C. (2010, September). Race for the Arctic, and for FDI (+infographics). Russia Beyond the 
Headlines. Retrieved from http://rbth.com/articles/2010/09/15/race_for_arctic_and_fdi04945.html 
85 Baker, J., & Byers, M. (2012). Crossed Lines: The Curious Case of the Beaufort Sea Maritime Boundary 
Dispute. Ocean Development & International Law, 43(1), p. 71. 
86 Ibid. 
 Concretely, a three-step approach will be made. To begin, the will be classification and 
categorization of the data on the disputes. The two categories will be on their similarities and 
differences, and also on the role that the institutions had in the dispute’s evolution. Next the 
relationship between both categories and the data obtained will be explored. The final step 
will be to determine whether the hypothesis is to be accepted or rejected.  
In order to do so, we will be using certain criteria which have been explored in the theoretical 
framework. As we have previously explored, institutions can have positive impacts on states 
in different ways. Neoclassical realists argue that institutions, as shaper and promoter of 
ideas, can play a role in a state’s foreign policy. As for neoliberal institutionalism, it argues 
that institutions can facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty and making mutually 
beneficial agreements, as well as aiding states in reaching compromises with mutual benefits 
and mutual gains.  
The collected data will be converged rather than analyzed independently, in order to gain 
better insight in the chosen cases. This will give a clear, overall understanding of the role of 
the institutions in the cases. In turn, this will enable to determine if the institutions have 
facilitated the States in such ways in regards to the dispute. If they have fostered a dispute 
settlement-prone setting, the hypothesis will be accepted. If not, it will be rejected. 
 
 Chapter 2: INSTITUTIONS 
This chapter of the thesis will lay the groundwork for the analysis. As a reminder, the aim is 
to determine whether the institutions present in the Arctic are sufficient in aiding dispute 
resolution and cooperation among states. According to both neoclassical realism and 
neoliberalism, institutions are of paramount importance when studying a dispute: Based on 
the neoclassical theory, there is a possibility that institutions, as shaper of ideas, will directly 
influence a state’s foreign policy. On the other spectrum, based on neoliberalism arguments, 
institutions can facilitate cooperation among states by reducing uncertainty. 
This chapter will analyze an example of a hard law and soft law institution. The intention is 
to analyze both institutions in order to determine their effectiveness (or lack-of) at promoting 
cooperation in the Arctic.  
UNCLOS is considered a hard law institution since it legally binds the states that have ratified 
it. A hard law, defined by scholars Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, refers to the three 
following dimensions: (1) legally binding obligations; (2) such obligations are precise, or 
may be made precise through specific regulations; (3) they delegate authority to a third-party 
to interpret and implement the law.87  
Soft law is by contrast significantly ambiguous. It can be seen as “softer” than hard law; a 
quasi-legal instrument that exists once a legal instrument is weakened along one of the three 
dimensions aforementioned. To become a soft law, the instrument can be softened in varying 
degrees across one or more of the dimensions.88 The Arctic Council is a form of soft law 
institution, as its raison d’être is to act as a high-level forum promoting cooperation between 
its members. It does not issue legally binding obligations. 
While Antarctica has a comprehensive and overarching legal framework,89 the Arctic 
remains devoid of one. The five Arctic littoral states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and 
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 the United States) met in May 2008 in Ilulissat, Denmark. In that meeting the five nations 
stated that since they consider UNCLOS able to provide a solid foundation to ensure 
responsible management, it was not deemed necessary to develop a comprehensive and 
overarching international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.90 The five states further 
pledged to actively seek to strengthen cooperation based on trust and transparence through 
mutual exchange of data and analyses.91 
This pledge by the five Arctic littoral states is a paper example of government rationally 
seeking to work with an international institution, which was itself formed with the intention 
of facilitating cooperation between states. The case studies will serve to show how the 
institutions have achieved this objective of cooperation facilitation. 
 
2.1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 “Navigational rights, territorial sea limits, economic jurisdiction, legal status of 
resources on the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, passage of ships 
through narrow straits, conservation and management of living marine resources, 
protection of the marine environment, a marine research regime and, a more unique 
feature, a binding procedure for settlement of disputes between States - these are 
among the important features of the treaty.”92  
UNCLOS is an example of hard law, as it is a binding legal regime for countries that have 
ratified it. It forms the sole legal framework encompassing the region. While not unique to 
it, it plays a vital role in the region’s international legal regime. By its nature as a binging 
legal regime, it becomes in itself an actor in the Arctic. It fosters order in the region by 
reducing uncertainty. By reducing uncertainty, UNCLOS reduces the anarchic nature of the 
region. Analyzing UNCLOS’ role in the two disputes will permit to determine to what extent 
it has been capable of enabling cooperation between states, and if it has been capable of 
fostering mutually beneficial agreements in both cases. 
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 Rothwell argues that the law of the sea has been of paramount importance in developing the 
legal regime of the Arctic.93 It is quite significant in four regards: (1) the protection of the 
environment (Part XII—Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment); (2) the 
regulation of the territorial sea (Part II—Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone); (3) in 
regulating commercial activity within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Part V—
Exclusive Economic Zone); and (4) in regards to the continental shelf, including the extended 
continental shelf (Part VI—Continental Shelf). In essence, UNCLOS dictates through its 
provisions the area that a state has sovereignty or jurisdiction over. 
As a whole, UNCLOS can be seen as the overarching legal system of the oceans. As the 
president of the third convention on the Law of the Sea has coined, it is the “Constitution for 
the Oceans”94. As described by the Encyclopedia Britannica, UNCLOS is concerned with 
“public order at sea”.95 Its scope ranges from internal waters to the high seas, including its 
resources, both in the water and under the seabed. It also includes provisions regarding 
settlement of disputes (part XV).  
Part XV sets a requirement for states to attempt a peaceful settlement of their disputes. It 
enables three methods for dispute mediation, which are: (1) the UNCLOS’ international 
arbitration; (2) the International Court of Justice; and (3) the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which was created as a court “primarily for the adjudication and 
settlement of disputes relating to [UNCLOS].”96 Generally, these dispute mediation methods 
have a marked potential of reducing the intensity of maritime disputes and preventing them 
from escalating.97 
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 2.1.1 A Brief History of UNCLOS 
UNCLOS was signed on December 10th, 1982. It initially came into force in 1994 and was 
ratified by 60 countries. More than 150 countries had ratified it by the 21st century.98 Before 
it was concluded in 1982, certain countries had already begun laying claims to their 
continental shelf. Such was the case of the United States. In 1945, the president Harry S. 
Truman extended the U.S. claim of natural resources of the sea bed contiguous to the coasts 
of the United States. This was done through proclamation 2667, known as the Truman 
Proclamation. 99 The United-States were the first country to unilaterally extend its jurisdiction 
over natural resources on the continental shelf.100 This encouraged other countries to do the 
same. Argentina quickly followed in 1946, by claiming sovereignty over its shelf and the sea 
above it. Chile and Peru followed their example in 1947, and Ecuador in 1950. They claimed 
sovereignty over a 200-mile zone extending from their coast. An increasing amount of 
countries then made their own claims, such as Canada, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, 
and Venezuela, among others.101 As a direct consequence the need of an overarching 
framework arose, which would ultimately become UNCLOS. 
The first conference held by the UN which would eventually lead to the creation of the first 
version of the law of the sea, UNCLOS I, was held in 1958. Four conventions were produced 
on (1) the high seas; (2) the territorial sea and the contiguous zone; (3) the continental shelf; 
and (4) fishing conservation of the living resources found in the high seas.102 In multiple 
respects this convention was a breakthrough, as it was a step towards order, harmony and 
better management of ocean resources. UNCLOS I had succeeded in defining the territorial 
sea. However, it wasn’t without its imperfections. For example, the breadth of the territorial 
sea had not been agreed upon, and neither were the fisheries limits.103 
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 In 1960, there was a second UN conference on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS II. The aim 
was to determine the status on the limit of territorial sea and fishery limits, which was lacking 
from the original version of UNCLOS. However, decisions on such statuses were deferred.104  
In 1967, the UN ambassador of the Southern European island country Malta Arvid Pardo 
made a speech to the United Nations General Assembly. He appealed for an effective 
international and overarching legal regime for the world’s waters. He spoke of the rivalry 
that existed in the oceans, of the increasing pollution of the seas, and of conflicting legal 
claims of the seabed potentially rich in resources, which undermined stability.105 His speech 
set in motion an undertaking that ended in 1982 with the adoption of the ‘constitution of the 
oceans’, UNCLOS III, henceforth known as UNCLOS.  
During the fifteen years between Pardo’s speech and the adoption of UNCLOS, the UN 
representatives of more than 160 countries negotiated for the creation of the new convention. 
The resulting convention, was created on December 10, 1982, and is still in force today. It 
was at the time a record in legal history, as 119 countries signed the convention on the first 
day it was opened for signature.106 The overwhelming number of countries that actively 
negotiated for the creation of UNCLOS is an example of the possibility of trust and 
cooperation between states and governments. In this case, more than 160 countries agreed 
upon the creation of an institution based on shared interests for order on the world’s oceans. 
It is important to note that as of yet, the United States have not signed the treaty, and therefore 
not ratified the treaty.107  
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 2.2.2 Dividing the Oceans according to UNCLOS 
One of the key outcomes of UNCLOS is that it brings a fundamental change to the concept 
of exclusive nature of territorial sovereignty. It created this shift by defining various 
overlapping spheres of rights and responsibilities.108 The direct consequence of this shift is a 
reduction in uncertainty, as the states are given a strict framework—‘persistent and connected 
sets of rules’—to work with when it comes to their waters. 
The convention divides the Oceans according to specific baselines. The division starts with 
internal waters then moves to territorial waters, which extends to 12 nautical miles (nm) from 
the coastline. Afterwards, there is an additional 12 nm (leading to 24 nm from the coastline) 
called the Contiguous Zone. From the coastline extends a 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). After this zone lies the high seas, which are freely open to all states, both coastal and 
land-locked. Article 87 indicates that this freedom comprises freedom of navigation, of 
overflight, to lay submarine cables and pipelines, to construct artificial islands, of fishing, 
and of scientific research.109 In addition to the actual waters, states have exclusive rights on 
the resources of their continental shelf which equally extends to 200 nm. However, a state 
can make a claim to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to 
extend it up to a maximum of 350 nm. The CLCS consists of 21 members, who are experts 
in fields of geology, geophysics or hydrography.110  
UNCLOS also defines some keys aspects in terms of state responsibilities, such as the right 
of innocent passage. It is defined in Part II, article 18 as traversing the territorial sea without 
entering the internal waters or calling port. The passage must be continuous and expeditious, 
except in cases of emergency. According to UNCLOS, article 19,  passage is considered 
innocent if it is not detrimental to the peace, order or security of the state. 
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 First defined by UNCLOS (Part II, Article 8) are the internal waters, located within the state 
itself—on the land-side of the baseline. The state has full sovereignty over these waters, 
including in limiting the access of foreign vessels. Foreign vessels do not have the right of 
innocent passage within internal waters. There does exist an exception in determining the 
internal water which applies to archipelagic states, described in Part IV. 
The second area defined by UNCLOS, equally in Part II, is the territorial sea. The sovereignty 
of a state extends to those waters, giving the state the right to set laws, regulate its use, and 
exploit the resources. This equally holds true for the air space over the territorial sea and for 
the seabed. Foreign vessels have the right of innocent passage within the territorial sea. This 
right is a key difference between the internal waters and the territorial sea.  
The third area defined by UNCLOS, also in Part II, is the Contiguous Zone. In this portion 
of the waters, the state is entitled to exercise a certain level of control. This control is meant 
to ensure that the state’s customs, fiscal, pollution, immigration and/or sanitary laws and 
regulations, both within its territory and its territorial sea, are not impinged on. If such is the 
case, still within the Contiguous Zone, the state has the right to punish such infringement.  
The fourth area defined by UNCLOS in Part V is the EEZ. The EEZ, contrary to the 
continental shelf, cannot exceed 200 nm. This zone gives certain rights and jurisdictions to 
the state. The state has sovereign rights over resources, both living (i.e.: fishing) and non-
living (i.e.: mining), in terms of exploration and exploitation. It also has sovereign rights in 
regards to conservation and management. This right over resources also includes the 
continental shelf within the EEZ. It equally includes other activities of economic nature, such 
as energy production from water, currents and wind. In terms of foreign vessels, they possess 
the same rights of free navigation as they have on the high seas, including overflight and 
submerged navigation. Other states have the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines 
within the EEZ, and have the right for any other internationally lawful uses of the EEZ, as is 
the case with the high seas. They do not, however, have access to the resources. 
The last area defined by UNCLOS in part VI is the continental shelf. It can be divided into 
two sections; the continental shelf itself, and the (potential) extended continental shelf. As 
 defined by UNCLOS, the continental shelf includes both the seabed and the subsoil of the 
underwater area that extends beyond the territorial sea. It is the natural prolongation of a 
country’s land, and can extend up to a distance of 200 nm from the baselines of the territorial 
sea.111 As per paragraph six and eight of Article 76, a state can submit a claim to the CLCS 
to extend its continental shelf to up to 350 nm from the baseline. Such claim must be made 
on the basis of geographical representation based on scientific data.112 The Commission is in 
charge of making recommendations in regards to establishing the outer limits of a state’s 
continental shelf. Once the proposed limit has been agreed upon by the coastal state, it 
becomes final and binding.  
The CLCS can be seen as potentially having a positive influence on states and their foreign 
policy by organizing the decision and negotiation mechanism when it comes to claiming an 
extension on the continental shelf. This commission is key to the Arctic, as ultimately, 
determining the outer limits of the extended continental shelf is the origin of disputes within 
the region.113 
 
2.2.3 Dispute Settlement 
As per the research question, the aim is to determine whether institutions are sufficient in 
maintaining the peace within the Arctic. This includes both UNCLOS and the Arctic Council. 
This section will give an important insight into the mechanisms of dispute settlement 
employed through UNCLOS. The aim is to better understand how this institution is able to 
influence its member states’ foreign policy, by encouraging them to cooperate with one 
another by seeking compromises. 
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 In case of disputes, there are existing provisions incorporated within UNCLOS. According 
to Article 280 of Part XV, Section 1, states are encouraged to resolve disputes through 
peaceful means of their own choosing. In case of failure to reach a consensus through 
negotiations, Article 284 encourages states to undergo conciliation in accordance to section 
1 of Annex V.  
If reaching a consensus or conciliation fails, there exists other options for settlement of 
disputes. These options are defined in Article 287, Section 2. The implicated parties of a 
dispute may decide to use any settlement method available. If the parties do not agree on the 
method, then more complex provisions will be used.114 This means that if the method of 
choice of dispute resolution by the implicated parties has failed, four procedures can be 
chosen from as per UNCLOS. They are:  (1) submitting the dispute to ITLOS; (2) 
adjudication by the ICJ; (3) submitting the case to international arbitration procedures in 
accordance to Annex VII; or (4) submitting the dispute to special arbitration tribunals that 
possess specific expertise for the dispute in question, in accordance to Annex VIII.115 Article 
296 states that decisions rendered by a court or tribunal in such matter are binding.  
From these abovementioned provisions, it becomes clear that UNCLOS, as an institution, 
should help prevent the proliferation of disputes within the Arctic. It does so by either 
encouraging states to resolve them peacefully, or enforcing legally binding decisions. In 
theory, UNCLOS should help prevent the appearance of new maritime disputes. However, 
in their paper, Nemeth, McLaughlin Mitchel, Nyman and Hensel have found that having 
ratified UNCLOS has no systematic impact on whether negotiations to resolve ongoing 
maritime disputes will be successful.116 The authors seem to support that the success of such 
negotiations depends entirely on the states themselves. While this holds true, by their nature 
institutions tend to encourage states to cooperate and act in mutually beneficial ways. As 
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 such, UNCLOS should be able to reduce the propensity of new disputes arising, and if one 
does arise, it should render its resolution more accessible and feasible.117 
Notwithstanding these provisions, some argue that UNCLOS is inadequate to safeguard the 
fragile peace of the Arctic and more needs to be done118. As a response to the growing 
uncertainty of UNCLOS’ ability to restrain the interests of states in order to maintain peace, 
the five Arctic littoral states have met in Greenland, Denmark, in 2008 to sign the Ilulissat 
Declaration. This declaration will be discussed in a subsequent section. 
The disputes within the Arctic are of high stakes, especially when considering the USGS 
estimate. Realism would argue that this has the potential of leading to conflict since states 
will seek control over territory as a defensive mechanism, and in order to prevent other states 
from controlling it and having access to the territory’s resources.119 Equally, neoliberalism 
would recognize that the scarcity of resources in the region could be a factor that could 
worsen potential disputes. 
The ability of UNCLOS’ provisions in mediating disputes and having a positive influence on 
Arctic states to reach consensuses would be a direct translation of neoliberalism’s triumph 
over neoclassical realism. It would serve as an indicator that despite the potential for dispute, 
institutions are sufficient in maintaining peace in the region. On the other hand, if conflict 
arises, it would indicate that despite their role as a shaper of ideas they are insufficient by 
themselves to have an effect on a state’s foreign policy. 
 
2.2.4 UNCLOS and CLCS in territorial and resource disputes 
According to Annex II of UNCLOS, a state can lay claim to an extended continental shelf. It 
must submit its claim to the CLCS along its supporting data, proving that the area is 
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 geographically linked to its own continental shelf. That is, the state must prove that it’s an 
extension of its continental shelf.120 This mechanism serves to create order and predictability 
within the Arctic. 
As for the CLCS itself, it is comprised of twenty-one members who are experts in differing 
fields such as geology, geophysics or hydrography. These members are elected by States 
Parties to the Convention from among their nationals. Care is put in order to ensure that there 
is equitable geographical representation within the commission.121  
Once a state has agreed to establish its continental shelf limits based on the recommendations 
of the CLCS, the limits become final and binding, according to Article 76 (Part 6).122 If 
applicable, the state must also negotiate over other claimants who are competing for the same 
extended continental shelf, as the outer limit of the extended continental shelf is only binding 
for the state in question, not the international community.  
The continental shelf is additional territory beyond a state’s land, giving them sovereign 
rights over the resources. This additional territory can be further extended up to 350 nm from 
the baseline, given certain criteria are respected. This equally grants the state full sovereignty 
over the resources on that seabed and subsoil. In the case of the Arctic, one of the resource 
of interest as outlined by the USGS study is petroleum. The region’s disputes are territorial 
by nature, and the extension of the continental shelf is related to some of those disputes. This 
is the case, for example, of the sovereignty over part of the North Pole’s seabed. Certain 
disputes within the Arctic will stem from just that: defining the extended limit of the 
continental shelf of the various states making their claim.123 
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 A concrete example of claims over an extended continental shelf within the Arctic is in 
regards to the North Pole. The four littoral states who have ratified UNCLOS have claims 
that overlap each other, which in turn could become cause for tensions. This example makes 
it evident that UNCLOS, including CLCS, becomes essential for Arctic affairs. It is key to 
the Arctic as it is the institution that will enable these states to lay claim to the seabed territory 
revolving around the North Pole, and enable such claims to be processed in a rigorous and 
predictable manner. This will be made possible through the CLCS’ mechanisms.  
In order to lay claim to the seabed in the North Pole, the littoral member states of UNCLOS 
have been showing a marked attention to the Lomonosov Ridge. This ridge divides the Arctic 
Ocean and stretches between Russia’s Siberia and Canada’s Ellesmere Island.124 The ridge, 
with its extension being underneath the North Pole, is the gateway to that region. Currently, 
all four littoral countries that ratified UNCLOS—Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia—
have submitted claims to the CLCS for the Lomonosov Ridge, which in turns grants access 
to the North Pole.”125 
From the North Pole example, a first sign of UNCLOS’ efficiency in regulating disputes 
about territorial claims in the Arctic can be inferred. By respecting the mechanisms set forth 
by UNCLOS through the CLCS, states have showed that they are willing to abide by the 
institution’s mechanisms within the Arctic. In itself, it is a sign that the ideology of order and 
cooperation is present within the Arctic, and that states are willing to cooperate with one 
another and with the international regime in place within the region. 
There is however an important distinction between willingness to respect an institution’s 
provisions, and doing so. This willingness cannot immediately be translated into success, and 
must be further analyzed. Ultimately, the institution must be able to enforce its own 
provisions, and ensure that the states respect them. The North Pole example does give an 
insight of UNCLOS’ efficiency in creating behavioral norms for the states to respect; all four 
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 littoral states who ratified UNCLOS have submitted claims to the CLCS. While these claims 
are contentious to one another, they do show their commitment to the institution.  
The North Pole currently does not give further information since the process is still ongoing. 
While it does illustrate an important first step, which is the states’ willingness to adhere to 
its mechanisms, it does not permit to fully verify the hypothesis. That is why one of the case 
study is on a dispute that has been resolved. With the Barents Sea case study, the CLCS’ role 
will become apparent in resolving the decades-old dispute. 
 
2.2.5 Ilulissat Declaration 
The Ilulissat Declaration was adopted in May 2008 in the Arctic Ocean Conference held in 
Greenland, Denmark. It was adopted by the five Arctic littoral states, coined the Arctic Five. 
The intention was to address the implications of an Arctic becoming increasingly accessible, 
and to pledge the states’ commitment to resolve disputes peacefully. It further served to 
remind the international community that the five Arctic coastal states do not require to 
commit to a new comprehensive and overarching legal regime for the Arctic, as it is the case 
for the Antarctic. Through the declaration they affirmed to be fully committed to UNCLOS’ 
legal framework and to peacefully settle any overlapping claims.126 The states also pledged 
to work hand-in-hand with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in order to either 
strengthen current measures or develop new ones in regards to maritime safety and 
prevention.127 This pledge illustrates well Keohane’s argument that despite what is posited 
by realism, states can exhibit a clear desire to cooperate. While this pledge remains to be 
tested in some instances, in others it shows to have held true. 
Certain events and perceptions led to the Ilulissat Declaration, showing the increased 
importance of UNCLOS in regulating Arctic affairs. Prior to the Ilulissat declaration, there 
was a perceived lack of governance in the Arctic. According to certain commentators, 
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 including scholars and policy-makers, it found itself in a “legal void”.128 It was believed that 
this would inevitably lead to a scramble for territory, resources and geographic position129. 
The 2007 planting of the Russian has not helped in this perception. This led to further 
speculations about the fragility of the Arctic status quo, namely in regards to territorial 
disputes.130 This act has been further aggravated by Chilingragov’s declaration of Arctic 
ownership.131 
These factors encouraged a growing global interest in the Arctic. They also fueled a desire 
for some, such as the European parliament and certain scholars, to develop an overarching 
legal framework analogous to the Antarctic Treaty.132 UNCLOS as an institution was seen 
by some as insufficient in resolving or regulating overlapping claims within the Arctic, both 
existing and potential133.  
An argument justifying an overarching legal treaty is that states can opt out of binding dispute 
resolution provisions that can arise under UNCLOS, according to Article 298.134 Holmes 
argues in his 2008 paper that the ideal method to avoid disputes and facilitate cooperation 
would be through a multilateral overarching Arctic treaty, similar to that of Antarctica.135 
Another author argues that Antarctica and the Arctic share important similarities, and a 
                                                 
128 Dodds, K. (2014). Squaring the Circle: The Arctic States, “Law of the Sea,” and the Arctic Ocean. Eurasia 
Border Review, 5(1), p. 118.  
129 Carlson, J. D., Hubach, C., Long, J., Minteer, K., & Young, S. (2013). Scramble for the Arctic: Layered 
Sovereignty, UNCLOS, and Competing Maritime Territorial Claims. SAIS Review, 33(2), p. 39;  
Borgerson, S. (2008). Arctic Meltdown The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming. Foreign 
Affairs, (March/April Issue); Dodds, K. (2014). Squaring the Circle: The Arctic States, “Law of the Sea,” and 
the Arctic Ocean. Eurasia Border Review, 5(1), p. 113. 
130 Carpenter, B. (2009). Warm is the New Cold: Global Warming, Oil, UNCLOS Article 76, and how an Arctic 
Treaty Might Stop a New Cold War. Environmental Law, 39(215), P. 239 
131 Cited in Howard, R. (2009). The Arctic Gold Rush (1st ed.). England: Continnum. P. 2 
132 European Parliament. (2008). European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance. 
Brussels.; 
Struzik, E. (2010, June). As the Far North Melts, Calls Grow for Arctic Treaty. Yale Environment 360. Retrieved 
from http://e360.yale.edu/feature/as_the_far_north_melts_calls_grow_for_arctic_treaty/2281/; 
Rothwell, D. R. (2008). The Arctic in International Affairs: Time for a New Regime? The Australian National 
University, 8(37), p. 8.; 
Dodds, K. (2014). Squaring the Circle: The Arctic States, “Law of the Sea,” and the Arctic Ocean. Eurasia 
Border Review, 5(1), p. 118. 
133 Holmes, S. (2008). Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic Sovereignty. Chicago Journal of 
International Law, 9(1), p. 325 
134 Ibid. P. 339 
135 Ibid. P. 351 
 similar treaty would be feasible. The author does acknowledge that there are differences 
between both regions, yet they are not sufficient to prevent a similar treaty from being 
effective within the Arctic.136 
On the other spectrum of the debate are those who believe that a treaty is either non-
applicable, or not necessary. It is as a response to the growing concerns from the international 
community that the five coastal states met, in order to sign the Ilulissat Declaration. The goal 
of the declaration was to unequivocally reject the idea that some held of the Arctic—that is, 
a scramble for territory and resources.137 The Declaration serves as a method to keep the 
growing international community’s interest in the Arctic at bay, by “marginaliz[ing] 
alternative governance proposals, such as the Arctic Treaty”138. This leads to an expectation 
of a certain level of commitment from these countries, as the Declaration also rejects the 
concept that the Arctic will be the theater of a scrambled race for its resources and 
overlapping territorial claims. Quite the opposite, it adds emphasis to the state’s sovereignty, 
define by UNCLOS’ provisions. The Ilulissat declaration serves as a reminder and a 
reassurance that the five Arctic coastal states are committed to a law-abiding and disciplined 
administration of the Arctic Ocean. It emphasizes the provisions found in UNCLOS, thus 
keeping at bay the desires for an internationalization of the Arctic.  
Despite this pledge for cooperation, possibility for dispute is not impossible. There remains 
some who believe that UNCLOS is insufficient and inappropriate as a legal framework for 
the Arctic Oceans.139 An argument that can be summarized by the two theoretical 
frameworks at study in this paper. On one hand is the neoclassical realism point of view of 
the institutions in their current form. Despite their role as shaper of ideas and the influence 
they can have on a state’s foreign policy, they are insufficient to prevent disputes from 
stemming from the interactions of power-seeking international actors. On the other hand, 
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 there is the institutional liberalism point of view that the institutions operating in the Arctic 
are sufficient to maintain the peace, and that no further are needed. 
 
2.2.6 UNCLOS as a Hard Law Institution 
Within the Arctic, UNCLOS plays an important regulating role and offers key options for 
dispute settlement, which are the current reality of Arctic affairs. In presenting an agreed 
framework for dispute settlements and for determining the breadth of the extended 
continental shelf, UNCLOS helps reduce uncertainty between the Arctic states. It puts 
emphasis on a certain level of cooperation through Article 280, which encourages states to 
resolve their disputes peacefully through the method of their choosing. This same cooperation 
can further be enhanced by the reduced uncertainty brought forth by UNCLOS’ provisions, 
as it creates behavioral norms for states to follow. Furthermore, if all states follow UNCLOS 
and the CLCS’ provisions, it reduces the fear of cheating, and the states’ incentive to cheat 
as a defensive mechanism. 
The North Pole serves as a testimony of UNCLOS’ early efficiency in regards to the 
territorial claims of the Lomonosov Ridge by serving as the proper first step. While this 
example is not enough to determine the validity of the hypothesis, it remains an important 
insight on UNCLOS’ potential, and serves as an incentive for further validate its role in the 
midst of the case studies. 
 
2.2 Arctic Council 
An on-going constant of the debate on the Arctic’s future is the polar ice melts coupled with 
technological advances, which create an increasing number of opportunities for Arctic 
transport and resource exploitation.140 These opportunities are found both offshore and 
inland.  
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 The Arctic Council has member states, permanent participants and observers. Observers can 
be non-Arctic states, inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The amount of observing states on the Arctic Council 
is a testimony of the region’s prominence in international affairs, and that it is a matter of 
international interest. In 2013, China, among other countries—Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, India and Italy—was granted observer status. The EU’s status has not been 
granted as of yet, but is still on the table. To cite Rottem, “the Arctic is popular!”141 
Despite this flux in interest, development must remain sustainable to protect the fragile 
ecosystem of the Arctic. Cooperation between states is equally of paramount importance. 
These are two of the roles of the Arctic Council. Additionally, it is responsible for making 
policy recommendations in regards to the Arctic.142 Beyond being a forum for cooperation, 
through its working groups it is also producing a vast array of knowledge vital to policy-
makers in rendering their decisions. It is an example of a shaper of ideas; through its mandate 
and working groups, its intention is to influence the foreign policy of states towards a more 
sustainable attitude. It is meant to coordinate and facilitate state actions towards 
environmental sustainability. 
The Arctic Council can be seen as a decision-shaping forum, rather than a decision maker. 
This is explained by its current nature, which is of making non-binding decisions.143 It is a 
soft law institution, contrary to UNCLOS. Its aim is not to replace UNCLOS as the regulating 
body of the Arctic. Rather, it is meant to complement it and assist states. The UN Convention, 
as it has been previously explored, is the main regulating body in terms of potential 
contentious territorial claims. On the other hand, the Arctic Council aids cooperation in-
between the Arctic states.  
The Council is an eight-member forum; five of the members are the Arctic littoral states—
Canada, Denmark, Russia, Sweden and the United States—and the other three members are 
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 Finland, Iceland and Norway. In addition there are permanent participants, who have full 
consultation rights in regards to negotiations and decisions. These participants are the 
indigenous people’s organizations, Aleut International Assossiation, Arctic Athabaskan 
Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of 
Indigenous People of the North (RAIPON) and Saami Council.144 There are also observers 
to the Arctic Council. Observers have no decisional rights, as it remains the prerogative of 
the member states. However, they can make contributions and propose various projects. 
Currently, as observers, there are twelve non-Arctic states, nine inter-governmental and inter-
parliamentary organizations, and eleven NGOs. 
All of the Arctic Council’s activities are conducted through six working groups. These groups 
are composed of representatives from sectorial ministries, government agencies, and 
researchers. The six groups cover a broad array of subjects: Arctic Contaminants Action 
Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), Conservation of 
Arctic Fauna and Flora (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), and Sustainable Development 
Working Group (SDWG).145 
There are procedural rules in regards to the meetings, and also of the various subsidiary 
bodies of the council.146 Among these rules, it is stipulated that all decisions of either the 
Arctic Council or its subsidiary bodies must be made by consensus of all eight Arctic states. 
To reach consensus and render decisions, the Arctic Council operates at three distinct levels: 
(1) at the ministerial level, with meetings biennially (unless agreed otherwise); (2) at the 
Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) level, with meetings at least twice a year; and (3) at the 
working group’s level.147 
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 The ministerial level is in charge of the orientation the Council will take, and is central to the 
Council’s affairs. 148 In turn, each Arctic state designates a SAO. As part of their mandates, 
they discuss reports from the working groups, task forces and other bodies of the council. 
They are equally in charge of coordinating, guiding and monitoring the activities of the 
Council, as per what has been agreed by the ministerial level. As for the research groups, 
they are in charge of technical and research work, covering a vast array of subjects. 
By its nature, the Arctic Council is a key collaborative forum in regards to Arctic matters. It 
is seen as such by the eight Arctic states, including the five Arctic littoral states, which can 
be found in their Arctic strategy documents.149 However, the Declaration of the Arctic 
Council is clear that the Arctic Council “should not deal with matters related to military 
security”.150 This can be seen by some as a limitation to the scope of the institution.151  
Due to its nature as a soft law institution, its efficiency is brought in question by certain 
commentators152. As it was the case with UNCLOS, the aim is to elucidate the efficiency of 
the Arctic Council in promoting cooperation within the Arctic. To assess its efficiency, its 
history, past effectiveness, and adaptability will be studied. 
 
2.2.1 History of the Arctic Council 
The foundations for the Arctic Council were laid in the 1980s, when awareness began on the 
environmental problems and military tensions of the Arctic region.153 Mikhail Gorbachev, in 
the Murmansk Speech of 1987, put in motion the turning point of Arctic Affairs by shifting 
the atmosphere of the Arctic from one of confrontation to one of co-operation. This shift 
translated to an important geopolitical change that would lead to both stability and peace 
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 within the region.154 In 1989, Finland appealed to the Arctic states to work in union towards 
the protection of the environment. This gave birth to the Rovaniemi Process, where the Arctic 
states were to meet regularly to discuss environmental matters. The Process was the 
beginning of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), the predecessor of the 
Arctic Council itself. This process began, in essence, based on shared interests from the 
various Arctic states. That is, on the desire to shift from the current Arctic state to a peaceful 
region, and to promote environmental sustainability. 
The Arctic Council saw its birth as a continuation of its forerunner, the AEPS. The AEPS, 
like the now-Arctic Council, was a non-binding body which brought together the eight Arctic 
states. It also included the “Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Nordic Saami Council, the Union 
of Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR) Association of Small Peoples of the North, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, the UN Economic Commission for 
Europe, the UN Environment Program and the International Arctic Science Committee.”155 
Working groups were created to assist the AEPS in its mandates. These groups are still active 
today under the Arctic Council’s umbrella; the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme (AMAP), and the working groups on Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment (PAME), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), and 
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF).156 
The Arctic Council itself was established in 1996. It was a result of the Ottawa Declaration, 
which recognized the Arctic Council as a high-level intergovernmental forum.157 Over the 
following two years, AEPS was merged into it, and the Arctic Council’s mandate broadened. 
In addition to the AEPS pollution orientation, its original mission became to promote 
cooperation, coordination and interaction amongst the eight Arctic states. Concurrently, it 
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 involved the Arctic indigenous communities, particularly in terms of sustainable 
development and environmental issues.158 
Once the Arctic Council was created, its rules and procedures were made official in 
September 1998, and later revised in May 2013. In the past, it has had three shaping debates 
about its nature. These were centered on its role in the Arctic, and in regards to its future. 
The first was prior to its creation in 1996, the second was in the midst of the Ilulissat 
declaration of 2008, and the third was as a result of the political shift of the United States, in 
2009. 
The first debate was concerning its role, before its creation. The United States desired to limit 
the Arctic Council’s jurisdiction to that of environmental issues. America desired for it to be 
devoid of formal competence, and wanted it to be solely a forum where environmental issues 
would be discussed.159 Thus, as per the United States’ desire the Arctic Council would be 
bereft of a legal personality, with no mandate over security issues.  
The second debate took place after the smaller de facto forum of the five Arctic littoral states 
came to existence in 2008, following the Ilulissat Declaration. This led to discussions 
regarding the role of the new-found Arctic Five forum, versus the role of the already existing 
Arctic Council. One important reason for this debate was that the Arctic Five could discuss 
political issues that the Arctic Council could not due to its limiting mandate.160 
The third debate took place in 2009, after the United States had a political shift in regards to 
both the roles of the Arctic Five and the Arctic Council. The United States critiqued the newly 
formed Arctic Five, favoring the Arctic Council. Canada favored the Arctic Five, and Russia 
acted as a middle-man.161 
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 2.2.2 Agreements 
The Arctic Council is cited by some as the primary international forum in the Arctic in terms 
of importance.162 In light of its appellation, a forum intended to facilitate negotiation and 
communication, it has in the past aided in concluding two international agreements which 
are both legally binding163. The Arctic Council has therefore fostered cooperation between 
states to facilitate negotiations until those two agreements were reached. 
The first was in 2011, the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search 
and Rescue in the Arctic (SAR). The second, in 2013, is the Agreement on Cooperation on 
Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. These two agreements 
illustrate quite well the ability of the Arctic states of working together.  
One key aspect of the former is found in article 3, which states that search and rescue regions 
are delimited without being related or acting as prejudice to boundaries between states, 
sovereignty or jurisdiction.164 In this case, UNCLOS retains its priority over the agreement. 
As for the latter, a similar provision is found on article 16. It states that “[n]othing in this 
Agreement shall be construed as altering the rights or obligations of any Party under other 
relevant international agreements or customary international law as reflected in the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”165 
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 2.2.3 The Arctic Council’s Role 
There are varying views in regards to the role of the Arctic Council’s role in the Arctic Ocean. 
Some arguments give it little to no importance since it is a non-binding forum. Other 
arguments maintain that despite this limitation it plays an important part in Arctic affairs.166  
The Arctic Council was not established based on a treaty, making it devoid of a legal 
personality. Since it does not have a legal personality, it cannot legally bind its members 
through provisions, nor can it adopt legally binding decisions.167 The reason for this 
limitation is the desire of the United States to restrain the mandate of the Arctic Council and 
its influence, making it able only to deal with matters related to the environment and 
sustainable development. They had equally desired the Council to be without a legal 
personality.168 The Council is therefore limited to a facilitator in the creation of agreements 
in the environmental and human development sphere. It is, as seen through the lens of 
neoclassical liberalism, a shaper of ideas. Its role is to influence the foreign policy of Arctic 
states through the influence of the various working groups comprised of experts in their 
fields. 
The 2008 Ilulissat Declaration had an impact on the perception of UNCLOS in the Arctic. It 
equally had an impact on the perception of the Arctic Council. Following the declaration, it 
became a matter of the Arctic five, rather than the eight Arctic states. The new Arctic Five 
was more tailored to specific matters that were not, at the time, addressed in the Arctic 
Council due to its limited mandate. 
A potential positive shift in attitude for the Arctic Council, at the expense of the growing 
interest of the Arctic Five, can be inferred from a 2011 event. It was the first time where a 
U.S. secretary of state attended the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, praising it as a 
preeminent forum aiding international cooperation of the Arctic.169 In Nuuk, in 2011, the 
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 foreign ministers agreed to strengthen the Council’s ability to respond to Arctic challenges 
and capitalize on Arctic opportunities by established a standing Arctic Council secretariat.170 
Over the last seventeen years following the creation of the Arctic Council, there have been 
growing in interest in the Council both from Arctic states and from the international 
community. This increased interest is illustrated by the larger number of observers, whichis 
now at 32. This includes 12 countries. As for the Arctic states, there was an agreement at the 
ministerial level on a vision for the Arctic for the next 16 years. Council members made a 
pledge to strive for peace and stability according to international law.171 In addition, the latest 
ministerial meeting attracted all foreign ministers, except Canada’s. This included United 
States’ Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian’ Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.  
A concrete outcome of this meeting was the signature of the legally binding agreement on 
the prevention and response on oil-spill. Furthermore, the Kiruna Declaration was signed. 
This declaration intends to improve economic and social conditions of the Arctic, as well as 
controlling the negative outcomes of global warming, safeguarding the environment and 
strengthening the Arctic Council’s role in the Arctic.172 
The founding declaration describes the Arctic Council as a high forum with the intention of 
promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction between Arctic states. Over the years it 
has become a prominent institution in Arctic Affairs.173 Notably, it has been contributing 
considerably to the generation of knowledge, increased awareness to the concerns of Arctic’s 
indigenous peoples, and favored international cooperation through the two binding 
agreements that were signed. 
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 2.2.4 Adapting the Arctic Council to the new reality 
While the Arctic Council has been effective in its environmental and sustainable 
development mandates, it does have limitations. These limitations are mainly caused by its 
nature as a soft law institution. As a soft law institution it is unable to enact binding decisions. 
It is equally limited by its mandate, being a regime focused on environmental and sustainable 
issues. By design it currently cannot actively contribute towards dispute resolution, contrary 
to UNCLOS. It cannot enforce currently existing treaties in the Arctic, nor can it create new 
ones. Currently, it acts solely as a consulting and cooperative institution, and offers 
knowledge through research groups. Being a body that does intensive scientific research, it 
can successfully leverage its knowledge and influence foreign policy. Despite this, it cannot 
enforce new or existing regulations. Rather, it can only make recommendations, which can 
be adopted by the Arctic countries based solely on their prerogative. 
Important questions arise from these limitations. If the Arctic Council does not have a dispute 
resolution mandate, how can it assist with future dispute resolution? Is it efficient as an Arctic 
institution in resolving on-going disputes within the region? Is it able to prevent new ones 
from arising?  
Currently, it would seem that it is not, due to its limiting mandate and structure. In order to 
play such a role, it must be able to adapt itself. The Arctic Council needs to shift its mandate 
from environmental and sustainability issues towards a more pragmatic role. Kankaanpää 
and Young, in their paper, have analyzed the data obtained through a questionnaire circulated 
to individuals who participated in the work of the Arctic Council. One of their key conclusion 
is that the Council, in order to maximize its effectiveness, needs to make fundamental 
adjustments in its core structure and its procedures.174 The authors also found that it should 
focus both on internal factors and external issues in order to expand the breadth of the Arctic 
Council’s mandate.175  
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 The next question to explore is whether the Arctic Council has been able to do just that, to 
adapt its nature and evolve in respect to the changing situation in the Arctic. If it finds itself 
unable to adapt, then it can be concluded that it will remain inefficient at resolving disputes 
within the Arctic. There are currently four difficulties that the Arctic Council is facing, which 
can impede its ability to adapt. 
First, the Arctic is currently undergoing fundamental physical changes due to climate change 
and global warming. This has translated in sea-ice extent and volume reductions. It is a 
rapidly accelerating process. The Arctic is impacted more severely by higher temperatures 
than anywhere else on the planet. The air temperature is currently rising at more than twice 
the rate of global air temperatures due to Arctic amplification.176 This change has led to 
increased interest in the Arctic region, namely of an economic nature, which is the second 
difficulty. This has translated itself in the desire of actors outside of the region to be 
incorporated to the institution. For example, in 2013, six new countries obtained the status of 
Observer States: China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore and South Korea. Observer states 
cannot actively participate in the Arctic Council. They can, however, take part in debates and 
scientific findings. This participation can give them unofficial and indirect influence. Third, 
the incorporation of new observer states can render decision-making within the council more 
difficult. Each observer state have potentially diverging interests and visions of the Arctic 
Council’s role, and can exert influence and pressure on the member states. The fourth 
difficulty has existed since the birth of the Arctic Council, notwithstanding the new observers 
to the Arctic Council. Historically there have been disagreements between the members of 
the regime, beginning with its mandate when it was first formed. 
Considering all these abovementioned factors, how has the Arctic Council managed to keep 
track and to adapt itself? Environmental-wise, it has been active with the creation of 
important reports in regards to the situation of the Arctic. An example is the Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment of 2004 made possible through a collaboration with the Arctic 
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 Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) workgroup and the International Arctic 
Science Committee (IASC). Another example is the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment of 
2009, an in-depth report written by the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) 
workgroup. In terms of scientific research, the Arctic Council has remained current with the 
changing environmental condition of the region. Despite its soft-law status, the Arctic 
Council has equally managed to keep up-to-date remarkably well with the changing reality 
of the region through the two previously mentioned agreements voluntarily ratified by 
member states. With its reports, it contributed to bring international attention to the dangers 
of climate change within the Arctic and the importance of safeguarding its ecosystem. In this 
sphere, the Arctic Council shows that it has been capable of adapting itself to the new reality 
of the environment.  
While the Arctic attracts a greater range of players from the international community due to 
its richness in natural resources, the Arctic Council’s mandate remains limited. It has no 
jurisdiction on broad economic and political aspects. In order to adapt to this increasing 
interest in the region, it needs to develop a mandate in those two spheres. In this respect, all 
that the Arctic Council may currently offer is to draw the attention on potential environmental 
impacts of large-scale developmental projects. However, it has no real say in its orientation. 
Even the agreements it helped foster became legally binding solely at the prerogative of the 
states that ratified them. In the economic and political sphere, the Arctic Council has not 
adapted itself. Rather, it is still the individual states that are the actors at play. It is interesting 
to note that a potential first step in this direction has been taken with Canada’s Arctic Council 
Chairmanship of 2013-2015. The emphasis is put on the development for the people of the 
North. Canada’s chairmanship desires to prioritize the interests of Northerners, with an 
emphasis on “responsible Arctic resource development, safe Arctic shipping and sustainable 
circumpolar communities.”177 Interest is put in the economic and resource development, with 
the establishment of a forum, the Arctic Economic Council. This forum aims to encourage 
circumpolar economic development and foster a business environment to enable local 
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 businesses to engage with the Arctic Council.178 However, this interest seems to be limited 
to facilitate the economic development of indigenous business. It is not focusing on an 
international scale nor on large-scale investments. 
Observers do not have full participation rights in the Arctic Council. Their inclusion is a clear 
signal of the increasing interest in the Arctic, due to the potential economic gain from natural 
resource exploitation and shipping. Adding new observer countries in its rank gives the 
Arctic Council more credibility. It does, however, have negative impacts on its cohesion. The 
inclusion of new states can have a negative outcome on the governance of the Arctic Council, 
as some member states might oppose such additions. For example, there is resistance in the 
EU’s desire to join the Arctic Council as an observer state from both Russia and Canada.179 
The increasing number of countries obtaining the observer status could possibly impede the 
Council’s decision-making ability. Based solely on its history and debates about its structure 
and mandates, it can be noted that the Arctic Council has had important disagreements. There 
have also been foreign policy shifts from its member states. Since its inception in 1996, the 
Arctic Council has had important conflicts and debates in regards to its role. This is as an 
indication of its uncertain future. As of today it remains uncertain. Its role is under debate 
from its member states, due to disagreements as to how the Arctic Council’s structure should 
be modified—or if it should be modified—and what new role, if any, it should be given. 
Furthermore, there is also the matter of the rising importance of the Arctic Five. Therefore, 
based on the disagreements, the Arctic Council has equally not managed to adapt itself. This 
makes its future rather uncertain. 
 
2.2.5 The Arctic Council as a Soft Law Institution 
With its current structure, it seems an out of reach goal for the Arctic Council to adapt itself 
to the ever-changing reality of the Arctic. Due to its inability to adapt itself, it equally seems 
                                                 
178 Ibid. 
179 Depledge, D. (2015). The EU and the Arctic Council. European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 
from http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_eu_and_the_arctic_council3005# 
 
 impossible for the Arctic Council to evolve towards an institution able to deal with disputes. 
As long as it does not adapt itself and evolve to reflect the new reality of the Arctic, it will 
remain inefficient in dispute resolution. It is, however, effective in its own spheres of 
influence, even today. Despite this, it is difficult to see this institution shift towards a dispute-
oriented mandate.  
The Canadian chairmanship of 2013-2015 desired to strengthen the Arctic Council. Canada 
stated that it collaborating with the various partners of the Arctic Council with the intention 
of strengthen it and broadening its influence within the region. The objective in this is to 
grant a greater importance to Permanent Participant organizations, as well as maximizing the 
Council’s efficiency.180  
However, in its present state, the Arctic Council has failed to adapt. In the immediate present 
and in the near future, it is inefficient at resolving on-going disputes in the Arctic and 
preventing new ones from arising. As a result, this institution will not be considered when 
attempting to verify the hypothesis. Therefore, through the case studies, it must be 
determined whether UNCLOS itself is efficient.  
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 Chapter 3: DISPUTES 
3.1 Barents Sea 
The first boundary dispute to be analyzed is the Barents Sea dispute between Norway and 
Russia, which was peacefully and successfully resolved in 2010. In analyzing this dispute, a 
particular interest will be put on the role played by the institutions present within the Arctic. 
Namely, UNCLOS’ role will be thoroughly assessed. 
The Barents Sea dispute was an ongoing dispute that lasted for close to forty years. It began 
in 1974 and was resolved through an agreement in 2010. It was announced on the 27th of 
April 2010, at a joint press conference, by Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and 
then-Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. The Barents Sea dispute as a whole englobed three 
disagreements in different areas. 
The disagreement begun in 1974 and stemmed from a three-part dispute. Overall, the issue 
encompassed a territorial claim of an area of around 175,000 square kilometers, more than 
Ireland and Portugal combined.181 The area in question is home to one of the most important 
fisheries situated in northern Europe.182 Moreover, it equally contains substantial amount of 
petroleum resources. It is also of significant strategic importance to Russia, as it is a gateway 
to Russia’s only year-round ice free port located in Murmansk. This port is as an entrance to 
the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which is a shipping route used to transport oil and liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) from the East Barents and Kara Seas.183 At the moment when the dispute 
originated, it was believed to hold an important amount of petroleum.184 
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 The first part of the disagreement was in regards to the Svalbard archipelago. The second 
was on a section of the Barents Sea, termed the ‘Grey Zone’. The third was in regards to 
another area, coined the Loophole.185 
The dispute revolving around the Svalbard archipelago ranged from the mouth of the 
Varangerfjord and extended to 200 nautical miles from the mainland of both countries. This 
portion of the Barents Sea dispute was caused by the necessity of a boundary for the 
continental shelf and the EEZ to be decided. The Grey Zone portion of the dispute was in the 
north of the Barents Sea. This section of the dispute stemmed from opposing maritime 
boundaries of the adjacent coasts of both countries. This section required a boundary 
delimiting the continental shelf and the EEZ of both countries. The Loophole was found in 
the Barents Sea itself, beyond the EEZ of both states. This portion of the dispute required a 
boundary for the continental shelf between the coasts of mainland Norway and Svalbard, and 
Russia.186 
 
3.1.1 History and Background of the Dispute 
In 1920, the Svalbard Treaty between Norway and the USSR was signed. Article 1 
recognized Norway’s complete sovereignty over the Archipelago of Svalbard (then called 
Spitsbergen). This extended to Bear Island.187 The treaty granted the countries consisting of 
the High Contracting Parties—the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Denmark, 
France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden—the rights of fishing and hunting in the 
Archipelago of Spitsbergen and the territory associated with it. This also included Russian 
nationals and companies. 
In 1926, there was a Decree on the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee 
entitled ‘On the Proclamation of Lands and Islands Situated in the Arctic Ocean as Territory 
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 of the USSR’. This decree created what became known as the Russian Arctic sector, coined 
the ‘sector theory’ in Russia.188 The Decree stated, in part, that territory within the northern 
Arctic Ocean were proclaimed to be under the sovereignty of the USSR. That included land 
and islands, whether they were discovered or undiscovered 189 
In 1957, following the Norwegian-USSR treaty and the USSR decree, the Varangerfjord 
Agreement was signed. It served to establish the limits of the territorial seas between 
mainland Norway and the Soviet Union.190 This agreement did not cover the Barents Sea. 
The negotiations for the delimitation of the maritime zones of the Barents Sea and the dispute 
itself began formally in Moscow, in 1974. Informally, it had begun in meetings held in 
1970.191 The cause of the dispute was the methods used by both countries to determine the 
boundary lines. Norway made its claim based on the median line principle, established by 
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.192 The median line principle draws the 
boundary equidistant from the nearest point of the coastlines of both countries.  
On their end the Soviet Union used Article 6 of the same Convention, which states that 
another boundary line than the median line can be justified based on ‘special 
circumstances’.193 The Soviet Union—followed by the Federation of Russia—invoked as 
special circumstances considerations of demographic and military nature.194 The USSR 
argued that having sovereignty over islands within the Arctic, the territory should be 
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 delimited based on a meridian rather than a median. The Soviet Union’s claim ranged from 
its border in the Varanger Fjord to the North Pole.195 The USSR’s (and eventually Russia’s) 
initial position was based on its 1926 Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive 
Committee, which had served to define the Russian Arctic Sector’s limits.196 These 
boundaries were considered at first to be non-negotiable. However, when Russia ratified 
UNCLOS in 1997 they became implicitly negotiable.197 
In 1978, a first breakthrough was reached, when both countries came to an agreement in 
regards to the Grey Zone.198 The area it covered was found within the southern part of the 
disputed segment of the Barents Sea, and included undisputed EEZ of both countries. The 
agreement gave both stakeholders the right to exercise jurisdiction over fishing activity. This 
was provisional for one year, and has subsequently been extended for periods of one year. It 
has consistently been extended until the final agreement as a whole was reached. 
In 2007, further progress was made. The 1957 Varangerfjord agreement was updated and 
clarified, extending the maritime boundary. The boundary now reached up to the southern 
part of where the disputed area of the Barents Sea began. Ultimately, in 2010, Norway and 
Russia ended the Barents Sea dispute by signing the maritime delimitation treaty. As an 
indirect consequence, this put an end to the Grey Zone Agreement, which was no longer 
necessary as it was covered by the treaty. 
 
3.1.2 Agreement Reached 
There are common explanations or hypothesis explaining why the dispute was suddenly 
resolved in 2010 after decades of stalemate. Before the role that UNCLOS played through 
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 the CLCS is explored, an analysis of some common explanations offered by academics and 
think tanks will be made. 
Some explanations often cited are based on the loss of sea-ice (reduction of sea-ice extent). 
This reduction leads to a greater access of the region for economic activities. These activities 
include maritime transport, fishing, tourism and natural resource exploitation, in the form of 
minerals and petroleum. Until the dispute was resolved, neither states could claim any 
sovereign rights over the region and its important resources.199 This explanation has a heavy 
emphasis on economic incentive for both states. To add weight on this, the 2010 treaty has 
provisions on the shared resources found within the Barents Sea. Article 4 and Annex I 
concentrate on fishing, stating that both Norway and Russia are to cooperate closely in the 
sphere of fisheries in order to maintain stability of their activities and of their allowable catch 
volumes. 200 As for Article 5 and Annex II, it deals with hydrocarbon resources. While this 
in itself could be a satisfying explanation, it is not the only argument offered. Other 
arguments insist that institutions played an important role. 
In Moe, Fjaertoft and Overland’s ‘Space and Timing’ (2011), six hypotheses are given to 
explain the sudden resolution after over four decades of dispute201. While the paper does not 
give a definite answer as to which hypothesis is more probable, it is acknowledged that 
UNCLOS potentially played a large role. Quoting the authors: “There are, however, several 
indications that a desire to reaffirm UNCLOS as the pre-eminent framework for Arctic 
governance may have been a particularly important motivation for the Russian 
government.”202 The authors of ‘Space and Timing’ therefore acknowledge the possibility of 
UNCLOS’ role through Russia and Norway’s desire to show the world that UNCLOS is an 
efficient international regime in fostering cooperation within the Arctic. 
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 Other authors are in accordance with this hypothesis. In ‘Russia’s Policies on the Territorial 
Disputes in the Arctic’ (2014), Konyshev and Sergunin highlight that Russia has underlined 
that any territorial and boundary dispute within the Arctic should be resolved diplomatically, 
based on international law and regimes.203 Another example of a state’s desire to put 
emphasis on UNCLOS’ role as an institution within the region. 
Sergei Lavrov, the foreign minister of Russia, stated to the Globe and Mail that while 
UNCLOS is not specific to the Arctic, it acts as the “primary and indispensable legal basis”204 
in the region. This corroborate the authors’ hypothesis that UNCLOS is used to foster and 
encourage negotiation and cooperation. 
From Lavrov’s comment, it could be inferred that Russia aimed to show itself as a 
constructive actor within the Arctic, one that follows international law and abides by 
institutions. This puts weight on the role of UNCLOS as the primary hard law institution in 
the Arctic. It equally puts weight on the Ilulissat declaration, which has been previously 
analyzed. 
It must be noted that the hypothesis of the key role of UNCLOS in the settlement of this 
decades-old dispute is not unanimous. Some academics argue that the economic incentive 
played a much larger role. According to Charles Emmerson, senior research fellow at 
Chatham House, the main reason for the agreement are oil and gas. He expands by explaining 
that Norway’s North Sea production is nearing its limit and Russia’s Siberian fields are near 
depletion.205 In ‘Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic’ (2011), Ulfstein and Henriksen 
conclude that the agreement has been reached in coincidence to the current state of the Arctic, 
which is a greater accessibility of resources due to sea-ice loss.206 Despite the working 
hypothesis of the paper being of economic nature, the authors recognize that the delimitation 
line was based on international law, and that both countries have “relevant factors identified 
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 in this regard in international law”.207 In other words, according to the authors, even if the 
reason for reaching a consensus is economic by nature, the institution present in the Arctic 
facilitated cooperation through preset guidelines as to how disputed territory should be 
delimited. 
In ‘Russian and Norwegian Petroleum Strategies in the Barents Sea’ (2010), Arild Moe has 
noted that while the dispute was ongoing the Russian side was insistent to cooperate 
alongside Norway in exploiting the petroleum resources found within the disputed area.208 
The Norwegian side was against, emphasizing settlement of the dispute before cooperation. 
It was agreed in the 1980s that they would not neither do exploration or exploitation of 
petroleum resources in the disputed area.209  
Some authors argue that both hypotheses (the key role of UNCLOS and the economic 
incentives) are valid, and can coexist in explaining the recent compromise. Konyshev and 
Sergunin are one example; they acknowledge the role of UNCLOS, and yet also claim that 
economic incentives were key in leading to the compromise. One key argument to support 
this hypothesis is Oslo’s urgency in exploiting hydrocarbon resources in the disputed area 
due to the fact that its oil production had been in decline since 2001.210  
While there is dissent to the cause of the settlement, the Barents Sea treaty serves as a 
reminder of the Ilulissat Declaration. The Arctic Five had issued a statement meant to stress 
the fact that they are committed to settle any overlapping territorial claims diplomatically, 
based on the comprehensive legal framework of UNCLOS. 
The Barents Sea also serves to illustrate that contrary to what is often put forward by 
neoclassical realism, which is a potential scramble for territory, such scramble never 
manifested itself.  
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 Academics and think tanks do not necessarily agree on which explanation of the resolution 
is valid. However, there a general consensus that the agreement could lead to a positive 
environment of cooperation for petroleum resource exploitation, and to a period of 
unprecedented cooperation between both countries in Arctic affairs.211 An example can be 
found in the news: Statoil and Rosneft have signed a cooperation agreement in the Barents 
Sea on the 5th of May 2012,212,213 and have completed it on the 21st of June 2013.214 This 
disagreement on the explanation of the resolution does not change the fact that the agreement 
was facilitated through the existence of UNCLOS. Norway and Russia reach a mutually 
beneficial agreement that could potentially not have been possible without UNCLOS’ help. 
 
3.1.3 Analysis of UNCLOS’ Role 
The economic incentive for the dispute resolution is an often used argument. It is even 
sometimes offered as the sole valid reason explaining why the dispute was resolved. 
However, this explanation alone is not sufficient; the reality is much more complex.  
For example, fishing is—and was—of paramount importance in the Barents Sea. Even while 
the dispute was unresolved, both states were already exploiting that resource through the 
Grey zone Agreement. As for petroleum, while the dispute was ongoing it was assumed and 
accepted that there was an important hydrocarbon potential within the conflicted area. Doré, 
in a paper written in 1993, acknowledged that the hydrocarbon potential was broadly believed 
to be significant, as the region found itself in the vicinity of Russian waters known to be rich 
in hydrocarbons. Already at the time that the article was written, Russians had identified 
potential wells within the disputed zone. Furthermore, they had drilled wells in proximity to 
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 the median line, implying the presence of the resource.215 In a map of the Russian Barents 
Sea and Kara Sea (figure 6 in his article), which includes the disputed area, Doré shows that 
there existed prospects. Some were solely identified, while others were either “ready for 
drilling, or with some initial drilling.”216 
The knowledge of the presence of resource does not completely discredit the economic 
incentive as being the catalyst for resolving the dispute. If it were the sole reason why the 
dispute had been resolved, it is reasonable to assume that it would not have lasted for four 
decades. UNCLOS, through the CLCS, played a more important role than economic 
incentives alone.  
Certain elements are necessary to better understand why the dispute was suddenly resolved 
after over forty years, which is an explanation more complex than relying solely on economic 
factors. The elements of importance are: (1) UNCLOS itself, serving as a guideline for 
negotiations; (2) the Ilulissat Declaration, whereas the Arctic states had pledged to resolve 
disputes peacefully; and (3) the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the 
missing link in common explanations of the resolution. 
UNCLOS served as a general guideline for negotiations, even though the dispute was not 
brought forth to the ICJ. When considering the Ilulissat Declaration and the States’ desire to 
show the international community their ability to cooperate and resolve disputes peacefully, 
the importance of the institution in the resolution of the Barents Sea dispute is better 
understood. The institution was key, especially through CLCS. UNCLOS’ CLCS played a 
crucial role in the dispute’s resolution. As the North Pole example has illustrated, both 
Norway and Russia acknowledged CLCS as the prime authority in determining the limits of 
the extended continental shelf. This can be inferred from their adherence to its mechanisms.  
In 2006, on the 27th of November, Norway submitted its request to the CLCS according to 
Article 76, paragraph 8 of UNCLOS. The submission was for three different areas found in 
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 the North East Atlantic and in the Arctic: The Loop Hole in the Barents Sea, the Western 
Nansen Basin in the Arctic Ocean and the Banana Hole in the Norwegian Sea.217 The 
summary of the CLCS’ recommendation followed in 2009, which was made public. Its 
analysis gives a crucial insight on how the CLCS helped solve the Barents Sea dispute. 
The claim of interest for the purpose of this thesis is Norway’s extended continental shelf 
claim for the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea. Upon submission of its claim, the CLCS agreed 
with Norway’s data. It made a recommendation that no further data, whether scientific or 
technical, need to be gathered in order to support the claim of the regional location of its 
continental slope.218 It was acknowledged by the CLCS that the Loop Hole was part of the 
submerged prolongation of landmasses of Norway and Svalbard.219 The CLCS recognized 
that the seabed and subsoil within the Loop Hole, beyond the 200 nm of Norway and Russia’s 
coasts was part of their continental shelves.220 The commission made a formal 
recommendation in regards to Norway’s delimitation of its extended continental shelf in the 
Loop Hole area. The recommendation emphasized that Norway should proceed to this 
agreement with the Russian Federation in order that both states share entitlement to resources 
located within the seabed.221 While the CLCS acknowledged Norway’s claim on the 
extended continental shelf of that area, there was more to it; it encouraged a peaceful dispute 
settlement between both states. 
As the Summary of the recommendations of the CLCS illustrate, the recommendations were 
somewhat complex, and not entirely direct. The CLCS conceded that “Only a bilateral 
delimitation between Norway and the Russian Federation remains to be carried out to 
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 delineate the extent of each coastal State’s continental shelf in the Loop Hole”.222 In essence, 
Norway’s claim would not be finalized, nor would it acquire its maritime boundaries, until 
the dispute with Russia was resolved. That is, until a bilateral delimitation was reached. The 
final recommendation of the CLCS added emphasis regarding this. It stated that once a 
maritime boundary delimitation agreement was reached between both states, it should be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the UN charts, and should show how the extended 
continental shelf was delimited.223 
From analyzing the final recommendations of the CLCS on the extended continental shelf in 
the Loop Hole region of the Barents Sea, and considering the timeline of the Barents Sea 
dispute, it becomes clear how it acted as a catalyst to resolve the dispute. The Summary was 
issued in 2009, and in 2010, roughly one year after it was issued—and after forty years of 
stagnation—the disputed was solve. This settlement gave birth to a bilateral delimitation 
between Norway and the Russian Federation. This, in itself, is a compelling argument to 
demonstrate the efficiency of UNCLOS in dispute resolution within the Arctic. 
The next section of this chapter will further analyze UNCLOS’ efficiency in dispute 
resolution by examining the Beaufort Sea dispute. As it is still ongoing, parallels will be 
drawn to the now-resolved Barents Sea dispute. 
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 3.2 Beaufort Sea 
UNCLOS’ efficacy at resolving boundary disputes can be examined for the Beaufort Sea 
dispute, as it has been explored in the Barents’ Sea dispute. To reiterate what has been 
previously mentioned, while there are some important similarities, there is a key difference 
between the two: The United States has not ratified UNCLOS. 
In the Barents Sea dispute, UNCLOS was effective as a regulator by acting as an important 
incentive to determine boundary delimitations. This incentive was made possible through the 
CLCS’ process of delimiting the extended continental shelf. However, this would not have 
been possible if both states had not ratified UNCLOS, nor if they did not adhere to its 
mechanisms.  
In the Barents Sea dispute, it was not until the CLCS made its final recommendation of 
resolving the boundary dispute that concrete progress was made. This recommendation is 
what led to the dispute settlement, after years of stagnation. The solution was not solely 
brought by the economic incentives it offered. Rather, it laid in international law and an 
international regime. 
There are some key differences between both disputes. Other than the aforementioned key 
difference, another factor of importance is the nature of diplomatic relations between the 
countries. There are also some similarities to both disputes. The important economic 
incentive, in this case petroleum, is one of them.  
Despite existing disputes in the Arctic, there is a consensus between academics and policy-
makers that a new comprehensive treaty for Arctic governance is not currently necessary.224 
Policy-makers of the Arctic littoral states have agreed in the Ilulissat Declaration that 
UNCLOS is a sufficient legal framework, and no further overarching international legal 
regime is necessary in regards to Arctic governance.225 As such, UNCLOS is sufficient to 
foster cooperation and to reduce uncertainty 
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 Geographically, the Beaufort Sea is located in the Arctic Ocean between Alaska and the 
Canadian Arctic archipelago, north of the Mackenzie River delta.226 The overlapping 
territorial claims encompasses approximately 6,250 square nautical miles, which translates 
to 16,187 square kilometers, found north of Alaska and the Yukon and Northwest territories. 
This region is potentially abundant in hydrocarbon resources.227 As with other disputes in the 
Arctic, there is an important relationship linking law, policy, science and technology.228 A 
better comprehension of science’s role in informing can assist both lawyers and policymakers 
to better address the scientific realities of the natural resources being regulated.229 
Already in the 1970s it was established that the disputed area of the Beaufort Sea contained 
hydrocarbons.230 Recently, there has been important findings and resource expenditures in 
exploring the region that further confirmed this. For example, in 2006 a deposit of up to 240 
million barrels was discovered in the Northwest Territories by Devon Canada.231 In 2007, 
Imperial Oil Ltd and its sister company ExxonMobil Canada acquired an exploration licence 
in exchange for spending C$585 million on exploration.232 Following this, in 2008 BP won 
a C$1.2 billion bid on a Beaufort Sea parcel. In 2010 it was Chevron Corp who won a parcel 
following a C$103 million bid.233 
The dispute itself remains unresolved with both countries limiting themselves at agreeing to 
disagree. There are differing opinions explaining why the dispute is still ongoing. Some 
authors argue that cooperation and a compromise in the Beaufort Sea can be reached without 
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 resolving the boundary dispute.234 It is the view of other authors that boundary issues 
concerning Canada remain unresolved for the time being as there is no necessity to solve 
them just yet.235 In their paper, ‘Canada’s Arctic Interests and Responsibilities’ (2008), 
Okalink, Huebert and Lackenbauer explain that the ambiguity of the legal status of the 
Beaufort Sea has been to the advantage of both countries.236 However, the same authors do 
acknowledge that the picture as a whole could change, in part due to global warming and the 
opening of the Arctic.237 
Notwithstanding the Beaufort Sea dispute, there are examples of cooperation between the 
two countries in that region. In 1974, both governments established the Joint Marine 
Pollution Contingency Plan. Its aim is to deal with oil spills and other sources of pollution 
from vessels.238 It also contained an annex dealing with the Beaufort Sea, which defined 
jurisdiction, roles and responsibilities. In January 11, 1988, the countries signed an agreement 
on Arctic cooperation.239  In April 28 2006, they renewed the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD) agreement, as well as broadened its mandate to include 
maritime matters.240 In 2012, there was a third agreement signed, the Tri Command 
Framework for Arctic Cooperation.241 
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 3.2.1 History and Background of the Dispute 
Controversy between Canada and the United States in the Arctic predates the Beaufort Sea 
Dispute. The first initial case in recent history is the 1969 Manhattan crisis. In 1969, the U.S. 
tanker S.S. Manhattan navigated through the Northwest Passage (NWP). This was done 
unilaterally, without obtaining permission from the Canadian government. In retaliation, 
Canada enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in 1970.242 
The Pollution Prevention Act gave the Canadian government legal jurisdiction over vessels 
navigating through the NWP. However, this was disregarded by the American government. 
In 1985, another American vessel sailed through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, the ice-
breaker Polar Sea. This lead to further tensions between both governments.243 The American 
government did not ask permission to sail in the NWP since it did not agree with Canada’s 
position that the NWP lied within its territory. The status of the NWP is disputed; the 
Canadian government claims that it belongs to its internal waters due to the geography of the 
Arctic Archipelago. On the other hand, the American government claims that the NWP has 
an international status. By having an international status, it gives vessels from any states free 
right of passage as per UNCLOS. As of today, just as the Beaufort Sea dispute remains 
unresolved, so does the status of the NWP remains an issue between the two states.  
To better understand the Beaufort dispute, it is necessary to take into consideration the treaty 
signed between Russia and the United Kingdom in 1825. It served in part to set the limit of 
the states’ borders on the North West Coast of North America. The treaty delimited the 
eastern border of Alaska, which belonged to Russia, as the meridian line of the 141st degree. 
This line was to be prolonged “as far as the frozen ocean”.244 The treaty is crucial to the 
dispute, as it is used as an argument by Canada. 
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 The Beaufort Sea dispute began officially in 1976. Both states made a claim for a 200 miles 
fishing zone within the Beaufort area, which overlapped one another.245 The claims and 
arguments of both parties, which are leading to the dispute itself, are similar to those that 
were existent in the Barents Sea. Despite not having ratified UNCLOS, the United States is 
a proponent of the median line. The American government asserts that Canada is bound by 
Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. Canada objects this argument by 
affirming that there are ‘special circumstances’ justifying the sector approach delimitation 
method rather than the median line.  
Canada’s claim of special circumstances originates from the 1825 boundary treaty signed 
between the United Kingdom and the Russian Empire which sets the 141st meridian line in 
the Beaufort Sea. The United States became the successor to the Russian Empire when 
Alaska was purchased, and Canada the successor to the United Kingdom. The Canadian 
government claims that the land and maritime boundary should be set at the 141st meridian, 
according to the treaty. In contrast, the American government disagrees, claiming that it only 
applies to land boundary, not maritime boundary. The United States believe that the boundary 
should be delimited by an equidistant line from Yukon and Alaskan coastlines.246 This 
position has not changed over the decades, and the Beaufort Sea remains an area under 
dispute by both states. 
Initially, the Beaufort Sea dispute was solely understood as a dispute of a maritime area 
extending at the northern limit of both state’s EEZs. Recent mapping of their seabed has 
brought to light the possibility of both states of extended continental shelves beyond the 200 
nm limit, towards the North Pole.247 These recent findings have acted as a complication for 
the dispute. 
                                                 
245 Baker, J., & Byers, M. (2012). Crossed Lines: The Curious Case of the Beaufort Sea Maritime Boundary 
Dispute. Ocean Development & International Law, 43(1), p. 71. 
246 Renouf, J. K. (1988). Canada’s Unresolved Maritime Borders (p. 116). New Brunswick: University of New 
Brunswick. P. 9 
247 Baker, J., & Byers, M. (2012). Crossed Lines: The Curious Case of the Beaufort Sea Maritime Boundary 
Dispute. Ocean Development & International Law, 43(1), p. 71. 
 According to Baker and Byers, if the states extend their continental shelves, it could ease 
negotiations towards a settlement. The authors further argue that either Canada or the United 
States could recognize its counterpart’s position, as long as it applies to both inside the 200 
nautical miles and beyond. This recognition could be done unilaterally or bilaterally.248 What 
this translates to is that both states would gain and lose. There would be a gain within the 
EEZ and in turn a loss in the continental shelf, or the opposite; that is, a loss in the EEZ and 
a gain in the continental shelf. If states are more interested in their absolute gains, then they 
will be interested in such a compromise, as they will have a gain in one of the two areas. 
However, if both states emphasize more relative gains as would argue neoclassical realism, 
they might be worried that they are losing in one area while the other party is winning. That 
is, the fear of relative gains could, in this case, act as an inhibitor for the two parties to 
cooperate and reach a bilateral settlement. 
While UNCLOS offers a solution, the impediment of relative gain might affect both parties’ 
disposition at cooperating. This becomes even truer since in this situation, the institution is 
unable to reduce the existence of relative gains, despite its stability and importance within 
the region. The inevitability of relative gains—one state’s loss translates directly into the 
other state’s loss—likely acts as a strong inhibitor in reaching an agreement. The presence of 
UNCLOS can however help alleviate the fear of cheating, if Canada and the United States 
were to reach an agreement. By having very specific and detailed rules and guidelines, 
UNCLOS effectively reduces the propensity of cheating. 
 
3.2.2 Gulf of Maine comparison 
The Gulf of Maine dispute is similar to the Beaufort dispute as both stem from a disagreement 
in delimiting boundaries. It is equally similar as they are both in regards to access to their 
respective region’s natural resources. For the former it was fish stock, and for the latter it is 
petroleum. The Gulf of Maine dispute between Canada and the United States serves as a 
proper indicator to better understand the Beaufort dispute. It did not create a precedent for 
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 future disputes; rather, it gives an insight as to why the two countries have not yet brought 
the dispute in the Arctic to the ICJ.  
The Gulf of Maine dispute began in the 1960s and was initially pertaining to the continental 
shelf, resulting from petroleum exploration in certain areas of Georges Bank. Following this, 
in 1976-1977 there were new elements that were added to the dispute, namely in the form of 
living resources (fish stocks) within the disputed area. This occurred as both countries began 
delimiting their EEZs, which overlapped. Due to the inability to arrive to a consensus, the 
Gulf of Maine case was brought to the ICJ and was ultimately resolved in 1984. The decision 
applied to both boundaries simultaneously; that is, it applied to both the fisheries boundaries 
and the continental shelf.249 This type of resolution could be adapted to the Beaufort Sea.250 
The Gulf of Maine dispute illustrates a crucial conclusion that is necessary to the analysis of 
the Beaufort Sea dispute. If Canada and the United States are to resort to a similar binding 
resolution method for disputes in the future, it can be assumed that they will carefully weigh 
the potential rewards and the risks of letting a third party settle the dispute. If they resort to 
a third party, it is possible that its interpretation of international law might lead to a decision 
that is either prejudicial or unsatisfactory to one of the parties, or both. This conclusion can 
explain why both countries have yet to rely on an independent adjudicative body to resolve 
the dispute, like they did with the Gulf of Maine. As long as the possibility to reach a mutually 
benefiting agreement bilaterally exists, it reduces the appeal of subjecting the dispute to a 
binding resolution mechanism. However, it should be noted that this does not rule out the 
possibility of using a third party to settle disputes in the future. 
 
3.2.3 Current Status 
Similar to the Barents Sea, the Beaufort Sea equally serves to show that the pessimistic view 
of scramble for territory in the Arctic has not occurred, and that it remains unlikely that it 
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 will occur. As of yet, however, it equally fails to show that the institutions, in their present 
form, are sufficient to assist in the settlement of the dispute. 
As it was the case with the Barents Sea dispute, there is an important economic incentive in 
the case of the Beaufort Sea in the form of petroleum resources. As it is equally the case with 
the Norwegian-Russian dispute, it seems that the economic incentive has not been sufficient 
in itself to lead to a peaceful settlement. 
Considering all the aforementioned elements, why has there been a lack of progress? It is a 
clear contrast to the Norwegian-Russia border dispute that has found a peaceful settlement in 
2010.  As it was the case for the Barents Sea dispute, both Canada and the United States 
would greatly benefit from resolving the dispute; just as the Barents Sea is rich in resources, 
the same is true for the Beaufort Sea. 
One of the key differences between the two, previously mentioned, is that the United States 
has not ratified UNCLOS. Although it does recognize is as international law, it is it not 
constrained to abide by it.  
CLCS was vital in resolving the dispute between Norway and Russia. However, since the 
United States has not ratified UNCLOS, they equally are not party to CLCS, nor will they 
(until they ratify UNCLOS) submit any claims to it. A case similar to the Norwegian-Russian 
dispute that was resolved thanks to CLCS’ recommendation does not directly apply to the 
Beaufort Sea. In short, the United States does not have the same kind of incentives that 
Norway and Russia had. However, this does not imply that the Barents Sea resolution cannot 
be used as a guideline for the ongoing Beaufort Sea dispute. 
 
3.2.4 Analysis of potential solutions 
All three disputes studied illustrate a common denominator; parties advocate different 
methods to divide the disputed area. In order to resolve such a dispute, an alternative 
delimitation method acceptable for both parties must be found. This was accomplished 
bilaterally between Norway and Russia for the Barents Sea dispute, and imposed by the ICJ 
 for the Gulf of Maine dispute. In both cases, the solution was found with the help of an 
international institution; with UNCLOS’ CLCS for the former, and with the ICJ for the latter. 
From this observation, it becomes evident that an alternative delimitation criteria is needed 
to resolve the boundary dispute of the Beaufort Sea. This dispute can be settled bilaterally, 
as was the Barents Sea’s case, or by relying on a third party, as was the Gulf of Maine’s case. 
Using the ICJ to resolve the dispute translates in an uncertain result for both parties. Since 
the Beaufort Sea is a petroleum-rich area, it could explain why it this solution has yet to be 
used.  
The Gulf of Maine does show that international law can resolve a dispute through a binding 
decision. It equally shows that an institution is able to successfully resolve a dispute. The 
Barents Sea dispute illustrates that a bilateral agreement is possible, one that is mutually 
beneficial for both parties. It also shows the potential for institutions, when appropriate to the 
dispute, to help find a satisfactory solution to both parties through its rules and guidelines. 
Norway and Russia were able to put aside their fear of the other state’s relative gain in order 
to capitalize on absolute gains. The same logic could be equally true of Canada and the United 
States. Only by relinquishing the fear of relative gains can the dispute be settled. In turn, this 
will enable the states to capitalize on their respective absolute gains. That is, to benefit from 
resolving the dispute. This is why a flexible approach with compromises from both parties is 
necessary to reach a consensus, as was the case with Norway and Russia. Three potential 
solutions are explored. 
A first alternative would be for both states to apply a similar delimitation type that was used 
to solve the Barents Sea. In the Barents Sea dispute, both Norway and Russia gained access 
to sensibly the same area in terms of territory through a modified equidistant line. Canada 
and the United States could follow the example and adopt a modified equidistant line in order 
to reach a result which would yield no winner or loser over the other. This modified line 
would be based on the median line, but modified to reach an equitable result. This would 
satisfy both parties’ argument and claim: It would agree with the equidistant line favored by 
America while respecting Canada’s coastline. 
 As a second option, either the Canadian or American government can accept the other party’s 
claim as is. This option follows what was argued by Baker and Byers in their paper ‘Crossed 
Lines: The Curious Case of the Beaufort Sea Maritime Boundary Dispute’ (2012). As the 
authors have argued, accepting the positions as-is would yield in itself to a compromise. 
Where one state would benefit from the EEZ perspective, the other would benefit from the 
continental shelf perspective. 
Alternatively, a third option would be to leave the dispute unresolved, but aim for joint 
resource development and exploitation. Canada and the United States could jointly explore 
and develop petroleum resources in that region, despite the unresolved boundary dispute. 
This would grant them equal benefits while avoiding a complex dispute resolution process. 
Instead of determining the boundary of the disputed areas, both states would have to 
determine the boundary of the development zone, and decide how it will be administered and 
how resources will be shared. 
The Barents Sea served to show that a satisfactory consensus can be reached bilaterally. More 
importantly, it showed how an institution was able to guide two states to reach such 
consensus, after decades of stagnation. The Gulf of Maine also served to show that a decision 
can be rendered by a third party. However, that decision is binding, and the states have very 
little control over it. If Canada and the United States want to maintain control of how the 
Beaufort Sea is divided, the former option is the ideal alternative. Only by using the Barents 
Sea dispute as a guideline, and taking advantage of institutions at play in the Arctic can a 
mutually beneficial consensus be reached. 
 
3.2.5 UNCLOS’ Efficiency 
From those two Arctic case studies, we can deduct that UNCLOS has a mixed record in the 
region. While it was a key player in the Barents Sea resolution, it was unable to help achieve 
a consensus in the Beaufort Sea dispute. This failure could be explained by the fact that 
America has not ratified UNCLOS, and has no pressure to abide by its mechanisms. This 
isn’t an alleviating argument for UNCLOS’ efficiency; rather, it is a hypothesis that could 
 explain why it has failed to help both states reach an agreement for the Beaufort Sea. As long 
as the United States does not ratify UNCLOS, it will have no incentives to abide by its 
mechanisms, which lessens the institution’s efficiency within the region. Despite this, the 
Gulf of Maine case, which is strikingly similar to the Beaufort Sea dispute, was successfully 
resolved by one of the dispute mediation methods of UNCLOS, the International Court of 
Justice. Such method could equally be used for the Beaufort Sea. Hence, the Gulf of Maine 
shows that, just as was the case for the Barents Sea dispute, that UNCLOS and its 
mechanisms can be quite successful in resolving disputes. 
Despite this failure to help resolve the Beaufort Sea, it seems that states acknowledge 
UNCLOS and the CLCS’ role as a mediator within the Arctic. The Barents Sea is a clear 
example. Instead of insisting on unilateral claims, Norway and Russia have shown that they 
are ready to follow the CLCS’ recommendations. The Ilulissat Declaration serves to remind 
the international community that UNCLOS is vital and integral to Arctic cooperation. That 
is, its guidelines are key for states to cooperate successfully, and are equally key to bring 
order in an otherwise anarchic environment. While the case of the North Pole is far from 
settled, it seems that the current direction of the states is to follow UNCLOS’ mechanisms 
for the extended continental shelf. 
Ultimately, while UNCLOS does not have a perfect record, it does remain an efficient 
institution in resolving, or at the very least, mitigating disputes. Its efficiency is, however, 
dependant on a state’s willingness to observe its legal norms. Up to this point, UNCLOS has 
shown efficiency at resolving disputes. However, there exists other long-standing disputes 
within the Arctic that have yet to be resolve, which will continuously test the institution’s 
role within the region.  
 CONCLUSION 
Due to climate change and global warming, the Arctic has become increasingly accessible 
for resource exploitation. On an economic standpoint, it has become much more attractive 
over the past decades. While the focus is often on petroleum resources, there are other 
potential economic activities of note within the region: Fisheries, tourism, shipping and 
mining. This newfound interest in Arctic affairs can be translated in territorial competition 
between Arctic states in order to claim sovereignty over natural resources found within those 
territories, namely for those lying beneath the ocean.  
The aim of this thesis was to analyze which International Relations paradigm best describes 
current Arctic affairs; whether it’s a propensity for conflict as would argue neoclassical 
neorealism, or on the opposite, a tendency for cooperation as would argue institutional 
liberalism. From the literature review, it has been found that both theories are key to 
understanding the state of affairs in the Arctic. The literature can be classified as either 
generally optimist, or generally pessimist. The former tends share the beliefs of 
neoliberalism, that is, that institutions are sufficient in fostering cooperation. The latter shares 
beliefs with neoclassical realism, arguing that there is a strong potential scramble for resource 
and territory in the region. 
An opening of the region due to global warming translates to a higher potential for disputes 
and conflicts, and can lead to tensions between states. As such, it leads to a higher spectrum 
of anarchy. This is where the role of institutions within the region becomes key. 
Understanding the diplomatic situation of the Arctic is vital as the region becomes 
increasingly accessible through the physical changes it is undergoing.  
In order to determine the possibility of cooperation rather than dispute, it is important to study 
in-depth the institutions at play within the Arctic. Two institutions were chosen: the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council. It was, 
however, determined that the Arctic Council’s role and nature was irrelevant in dispute 
avoidance and resolution. While it has a role of facilitating cooperation and communication 
between countries, it is not equipped for a dispute resolution role. This is due to its lack of a 
 legal personality and the limitations of its mandate. UNCLOS was analyzed to determine if 
it is able to facilitate cooperation between the states, but also to determine if its dispute 
resolution mechanisms were efficient. 
In order to analyze UNCLOS’ efficiency, two case studies were used. Both the Barents Sea 
dispute, between Norway and Russia, and the Beaufort Sea, between Canada and the United 
States, were studied. The former lasted for over four decades, and was ultimately resolved in 
2010. The latter is still ongoing. The Barents Sea dispute is a prime example of how an 
institution was able to facilitate dispute resolution between two states, despite a stalemate 
that lasted for decades. This was mainly made possible through the recommendations by the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). As such, UNCLOS was able to 
foster cooperation, as predicted by neoliberalism. Furthermore, the Barents Sea’s resolution 
serves as a guideline for existing and future disputes within the polar region, and could be of 
positive influence on the Beaufort Sea Dispute. 
The second case study was the Beaufort Sea dispute, which remains unresolved as of today. 
In the past, Canada and the United States have found themselves with a similar dispute in the 
Gulf of Maine, and it was resolved through the International Court of Justice, which enforced 
a binding solution on the two states. The use of the ICJ has not yet been solicited in the case 
of the Beaufort Sea, with both parties choosing, currently, to agree to disagree. 
Overall, within the Arctic UNCLOS has ambiguous success. UNCLOS’ CLCS was efficient 
at aiding Norway and Russia in resolving their dispute. In the case of the Beaufort Sea, it has 
failed to help Canada and the United States to reach a consensus. Despite the mixed track 
record, states—other than America—remain committed to UNCLOS. This can be inferred 
from the Ilulissat Declaration, as well as the submitted claim for the Lomonosov Ridge to the 
CLCS by the states who have ratified UNCLOS. Only the United States have failed to submit 
its claim, as it has not ratified it.  
By doing so, states show that they believe UNCLOS to be a decisive mediator within the 
region, and also indicate that they value its recommendations. They show that despite the 
anarchic state of the international system, the institution present in the Arctic has been able 
 to foster cooperation and are able to make mutually beneficial agreements. They show, as 
they have pledged in Ilulissat, that UNCLOS is sufficient. 
From the literature, it is apparent that conflicting opinions about the state of affairs in the 
Arctic can be classified as either views in agreement with neoclassical realism—that is, a 
scramble for resources or territory—or views in agreement with neoclassical liberalism—
one where the Arctic disputes are managed through cooperation, with the assistance of 
institutions. It can be further observed that contrary to what neoclassical realism would 
believe of the potential for Arctic affairs, as of yet there has been no scramble for resources 
or for territory.  
Whether this will remain true in the future remains to be seen. As it was briefly explored, 
there is currently a contentious area within the Arctic that is being claimed by all four littoral 
states that have ratified UNCLOS, that is, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia. This, and 
other disputes within the Arctic, are an indication of future challenges to be faced by the 
institution. 
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